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EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS ON CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

THURSDAY, JUNE 18, 1964.

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Fane, Groos, Hahn, Harkness, Laniel, Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean), MacLean, MacRae, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple (16).

In attendance: Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and Mr. Paul Faguy, Director of Emergency Measures Organization.

Mr. Drury was called; he read a prepared statement, respecting Civil Emergency Planning. The Minister, assisted by Mr. Faguy, replied to questions on that statement and on related matters.

Samples of pamphlets and documents prepared by Emergency Measures Organization were distributed to Committee members.

At 1:00 p.m. the Committee adjourned until 11:00 a.m. Tuesday, June 23, 1964.

TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1964.

The Special Committee on Defence met at 11:00 a.m. this day. The Chairman, Mr. David G. Hahn, presided.

Members present: Messrs. Béchard, Brewin, Deachman, Fane, Granger, Groos, Hahn, Lessard (Lac-Saint-Jean), MacLean, Matheson, McMillan, McNulty, Pilon, Smith, Temple and Winch (16).

In attendance: Honourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of Defence Production; and Mr. Paul Faguy, Director, Emergency Measures Organization.

The Committee continued its study of Civil Emergency Planning and in particular the work of E.M.O. Mr. Drury, assisted by Mr. Faguy, answered questions respecting the statement, on these matters, presented to the Committee on June 18, 1964.

The EMO NATIONAL DIGEST publishes six editions annually to provide current information on a broad range of subjects dealing with civil emergency planning. The magazine is published in English and French and may be obtained by writing to the Emergency Measures Organization, Daly Bldg., Ottawa.

In addition to publishing articles which reflect Canadian Government policy the Digest may also publish articles by private individuals on subjects of current interest to the emergency measures programme. The views of these contributors are not necessarily subscribed to by the Federal Government.

Director: P. A. FAGUY

ROGER DUHAMEL, F.R.S.C.
QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1964

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE

The CHAIRMAN: We are now beginning a study of the Emergency Measures Organization. Our witness this morning is the Minister of Defence Production, in his capacity as the minister to whom EMO reports.

Statement

Hon. C. M. DRURY (*Minister of Defence Production*): Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I am very happy to have been provided this opportunity to make a statement to your committee on civil emergency planning in general and on the activities of EMO in particular. The honourable members should keep in mind that the term "Civil Emergency Planning" as used in this context, has a broader meaning than Civil Defence. The term "Civil Defence" is usually interpreted as covering the measures taken to protect the general public, civil emergency planning includes not only civil defence measures as such, but also the planning required to help ensure continuity of government at all levels—federal, provincial and municipal; continuity of government being most important in assisting the population in surviving the conditions created by a war emergency and essential to help assure the proper conduct of the war and recovery of the economy after the emergency.

The interest by the public in the activities of EMO fluctuates with the degree of danger inherent in the international situation. There is always a great demand for information and serious concern on the part of the population whenever there is a crisis, such as the Cuban or Berlin crisis. Civil emergency planning, as military planning, cannot meet the requirements for adequate plans to protect the Canadian population if it is to work on a "stop and go" basis. On the contrary, adequate civil defence measures and civil emergency planning require long-range planning, training and testing.

Why Civil Emergency Planning Now?

For a variety of reasons, some people have argued that civil emergency planning is not necessary, that it is a waste of talent and money. We believe that civil preparations must be continued for the following reasons:

(*a*) If military defence is required, so is civil defence. Any future conflict would affect the Canadian population.

(*b*) It has been implied at times that the development and deployment of an anti-intercontinental ballistic missile system, the ICBMS, in North America might eliminate the need for civil emergency planning because of its effectiveness. This is not so! As stated in the white paper on defence "the future priority to be assigned to civil defence measures will be influenced greatly by the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system . . . . In the meantime, approved projects will be completed and maintained." This is further supported by statements made by United States Defence Secretary McNamara and military leaders. Mr. McNamara has said: "The effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system in saving lives depends in large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defence system" and "that recommendation (of production and deployment of anti-ICBM systems) will be entirely contingent upon acceptance by the Congress of a satisfactory fallout shelter program; without a fallout shelter program there is no basis whatsoever for deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system".

(*c*) Even if no Canadian targets were involved, Canada would be affected by random hits or by fallout from explosions in the United States.

(*d*) Effective use can be and has been made of civil defence in peacetime disasters to save lives. This is an immediate and practical use of civil preparations which, unfortunately, has not always been publicized.

Role and Aims of the Emergency Measures Organization

Because of the short warning time in the missile age and the consequences of a nuclear war, it was thought highly desirable to help ensure, not only the survival of the Canadian people, but also the continuity of government. Civilian control and leadership must be maintained in wartime. Seventeen departments and agencies have been assigned emergency roles and therefore are involved in varying degrees of planning, as required, in close co-operation with provincial authorities whenever applicable. Appendix 1 to this statement gives an outline of departmental responsibilities. These responsibilities are subject to review in the light of developments in emergency planning. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will make it available for the record without reading it.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that agreed by the committee?

Mr. DRURY: For the reasons given above and to ensure co-ordination of all planning, the emergency measures organization was established officially by a 1959 order in council (P.C. 1959-656) dated 28th May 1959, amended in 1963 (P.C. 1963-993) dated 27th June 1963, which indicates that the Minister of Defence Production shall have and through the emergency measures organization, shall exercise the following civil defence powers, duties and functions:

(*a*) the co-ordination of civil defence planning by departments and agencies of the government of Canada;

(*b*) the preparation of civil defence plans in relation to matters that are not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the government of Canada;

(*c*) assistance to provincial governments and municipalities in respect of preparation for civil defence where assistance is not the responsibility of any other department or agency of the government of Canada;

(*d*) general liaison with other countries, with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with provincial governments on matters relating to civil defence; and

(*e*) direction and administration of the Civil Defence College at Arnprior, Ontario.

The Aims of EMO Are Threefold

(1) To plan measures, including the most sensible use of our resources, that will assist the population to survive the hazards of a nuclear or conventional war.

(2) To plan for the continuity of essential elements of all levels of government so that civilian leadership, guidance and necessary instructions can be given to the Canadian people.

(3) Provision of assistance to provinces, and through them to municipalities, in developing their emergency services to meet disasters, through the medium of financial assistance on the basis of up to 75% federal contribution, the provision of training courses at the Canadian Civil Defence College and, generally, through the preparation of planning guides.

High Priority Programmes in Civil Emergency Planning

A great number of measures can be taken to ensure the preparation of complete plans. However, it has become necessary to deal with priority areas related to the two basic requirements: Public survival and continuity of government. To meet these requirements, the following high priority programmes were agreed:

(*a*) Public Survival

(1) Provision of warning of attack systems, including the location of explosions and fallout reporting. This is, and has been, a responsibility of the Department of National Defence.

(2) Provision of an emergency broadcasting system, capable of operation under fallout conditions to give instructions to the public and information of a general character on the conduct of war.

(3) Implementation of a public information programme with emphasis recently on instructions to the public in times of emergency, to assist in the saving of lives.

(4) Provision of emergency medical and welfare supplies and services.

(5) Protection against radioactive fallout. This is being effected through the provision of shelters, radiological defence and instructions.

(6) Preparation of plans for the mobilization of resources required in an emergency, e.g. supplies, manpower, communications, transportation, essential utilities. A system is under development for the rapid evaluation of the resources remaining after an attack.

(*b*) Continuity of Government

The following measures have been taken:

(1) Provision of emergency government headquarters and departmental supporting units, with adequate communications, at the federal, regional or otherwise provincial and zonal levels of government and also at the municipal level, wherever considered necessary. These preparations include arrangements for the warning of designated officials, their transportation on short notice and the manning and operation of facilities, with essential records available. (The construction and operation of central and regional emergency government headquarters is at present a responsibility of the Department of National Defence.)

(2) Drafting of emergency orders and regulations to ensure legal continuity of governmental authority by delegation of powers and decentralization of services, keeping in mind the need for close co-operation between federal and provincial authorities.

(3) Preparation of war books and readiness plans for all departments and agencies, outlining in summary form, for quick reference, plans and actions to be taken, the authorities, the inter-relationships of departmental activities, areas where government decisions are essential, and other related matters.

(4) Carrying out of training programmes, studies and exercises.

Progress to Date

I would not like to read to you a list of achievements in civil emergency planning to date and by emergency measures organization in particular. Again with your permission, Mr. Chairman, this outline will be made available for the record as Appendix 2 to this statement. A good deal remains to be done, however, to complete the above mentioned high priority programmes. It is suggested that this might be carried out over a period of some five years, and follow the following general lines.

1. Completion of the warning of attack systems, including location of nuclear detonations and fallout reporting.

2. Protection of the emergency broadcasting system facilities and personnel.

3. Completion of the network of emergency headquarters with communications. The zone programme is now underway.

4. Completion of the medical stockpile programme and provision of additional welfare supplies and services.

5. Consideration is being given to the initiation of a public shelter programme by the identification of available shelter space in existing buildings and with the provision of only the minimum of ventilation, water and sanitation. A survey of all federal buildings has been completed. Another survey of all public buildings is being carried out in Alberta to develop techniques of survey which could be applied in a national survey, and to determine the amount of fallout protection which could be made available for public use generally.

Major Points of Interest

Emergency measures organization is aware of the need to keep up to date with planning assumptions, research and development and to plan on a long-range basis in a co-ordinated and practical fashion. Consequently, the following points are of interest:

1. Close co-ordination with military plans for survival operations is most important. As stated to your committee by General Walsh on 11th July 1963, for budgetary reasons, "The full manning of survival operations system had to be curtailed". As indicated previously, the national defence programmes in warning system and emergency government headquarters are not complete. This affects civil emergency planning. It is recognized that there must be close consultation between emergency measures organization and Department of National Defence.

2. To assist in long-range planning, consideration will be given to the allocation of a five-year plan to emergency measures organization and civilian departments interested in civil emergency planning.

3. Greater emphasis will be placed on preparations for assistance in peacetime disasters. Whatever plans are made or services provided here, they would also be useful for a nuclear or conventional war emergency.

I would hope that the above statement has indicated to the honourable members of the committee the need for civil emergency planning in Canada, as outlined briefly above, and as carried out by the emergency measures organization and departments or agencies in their effort to help ensure public survival and recovery of the Canadian economy in and after possible wartime emergencies, and the saving of lives in peacetime disasters.

Departmental Responsibilities In Wartime

1. Agriculture

(1) Production on the farm including the provision of advice and guidance to farmers on the protection of farms, crops and livestock against wartime hazards such as radiation.

(2) Be responsible for inspection and regulatory functions relating to the quality and wholesomeness of food, to its freedom from an unacceptable degree of radioactive contamination, to plant and animal insect and disease control.

(3) Make post-attack assessments of the availability of farms, crops and livestock.

(4) Provide assistance and advice to provincial governments on a combined federal-provincial organization to carry out the above-noted civil emergency powers, duties and functions.

2. Defence Production

(1) Establish a War Supplies Agency to

(*a*) make post-attack assessments and determine the availability of surviving resources of food, energy, ready-to-use survival materials, production facilities and raw and semi-processed materials;

(*b*) assess supply requirements based on claims submitted by other departments and agencies at all levels of governments; compare requirements with availabilities; make reconciliation of competing claims and establish priorities as required;

(*c*) make arrangements for control and bulk redistribution of food, energy, survival materials and other essential commodities including those in government-owned stockpiles, except medical stockpiles and articles or equipment or things under control of the military authorities;

(*d*) regulate internal and external trade where practicable, particularly with respect to rationing, price control and foreign trade;

(*e*) procure by purchase, requisition, or other means, all goods and supply services required by government for civil and military purposes;

(*f*) control international supply transactions and maintain effective liaison for this purpose with supply agencies established by NATO or its members, specially the United States of America; and

(*g*) control industrial production, including the allocation of raw and semi-processed materials.

(2) Manage any government sponsored stockpiles of supplies, except military and medical supplies.

3. External Affairs

(1) Assess the international situation and report to Cabinet in international developments.

(2) Conduct relations with foreign governments and international organizations.

(3) Protect Canadian interests in other countries.

(4) Participate in information activities abroad in consultation with other interested government departments and agencies, including the provision of general policy guidance to the international service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

(5) Maintain and operate communications facilities for purposes described in paragraphs (1) to (4).

(6) Assist and advise other departments on matters having international implications.

(7) Interpret, in consultation with other departments as appropriate, treaties and other international agreements to which Canada is a party.

4. Finance

(1) Through the Department of Finance

(*a*) assess the availability of and restore banking and other necessary financial facilities, and exercise emergency controls over all financial institutions, including the Bank of Canada;

(*b*) provide and control the use of funds to cover normal and emergency federal expenditures including

(i) funds needed to re-establish the working capital of essential business, and

(ii) emergency financial assistance to provinces;

(*c*) advise cabinet respecting the imposition of emergency taxation and other emergency fiscal measures;

(*d*) advise cabinet on priorities to be given to competing demands on the financial and economic resources of the country in collaboration with other departments;

(*e*) implement financial moratoria as required, and

(*f*) conserve foreign exchange and control international financial transactions, in collaboration with the Bank of Canada and the chartered banks.

(2) Through the Bank of Canada

(*a*) provide assistance and advice to the Department of Finance on financial matters, as required;

(*b*) if required, operate a foreign exchange control system in collaboration with the Department of Finance, and

(*c*) have performed those normal functions and duties of the Bank of Canada as may be essential, dependent on the survival of facilities and the circumstances of the emergency and the directions of the government of Canada for which the bank is fiscal agent.

5. Fisheries

(1) Assume control over all fish catching, landing and processing operations up to the point where consumable fishery products enter into storage or directly into distribution channels.

(2) Make post-attack assessments to determine the extent of survival of fishermen, fishing vessels and gear, fish processing plants and fishery products in storage.

(3) Requisition or appropriate, or procure by contract or agreement as required the services of fish producers, fishery products, fishing vessels and gear used in catching fishery products, dock-side facilities required for landing such products, and fish plants and fish processing equipment.

(4) Carry out inspection procedures to determine

(*a*) whether a fishery product is suitable for consumption, and

(*b*) the extent if any of radioactive contamination of fishing vessels, plant and equipment and fishery products.

(5) In collaboration with other agencies of government, control the movements of and protect fishing vessels.

6. Justice

(1) Through the Department of Justice,

(*a*) formulate and implement emergency measures and advise the cabinet in connection therewith;

(*b*) advise other departments and agencies on legal problems that may arise in connection with the re-establishment and maintenance of the normal functions of government, and

(*c*) perform in relation to the emergency, the normal duties and functions of the Department of Justice.

(2) Through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police,

(*a*) exercise responsibility for

(i) the internal security of Canada in all matters of subversion and espionage,

(ii) the protection of specified vital points,

(iii) Port and travel security control,

(iv) the administration and operation of civilian internment camps, and

(v) the providing of assistance to other services and departments in the identification of persons unable to identify themselves;

(*b*) exercise responsibility in accordance with the police jurisdiction of the R.C.M. Police and in co-operation with other police forces, for the internal security of Canada in all matters of sabotage and police assistance in the enforcement of federal statutes and emergency legislation, and

(*c*) assist provincial and municipal governments and their police forces as requested in all matters pertaining to the co-ordination of emergency police planning and operations.

7. Labour

(1) Establish a National Emergency Manpower Authority to

(*a*) control and allocate all civilian manpower except those persons exempted from its authority;

(*b*) formulate general emergency manpower policies based on assessment of manpower needs and resources, and recommend any necessary legislation relating thereto;

(*c*) establish essential activities and critical occupations as a basis for manpower priorities, and

(*d*) maintain liaison with other elements and agencies of emergency government on matters relative to manpower mobilization and utilization.

(2) Through the services of the Department of Labour,

(*a*) analyze national manpower needs and resources;

(*b*) make recommendations to the authority concerning changes necessary in the priorities of essential activities and critical occupations, and

(*c*) control labour-management relations, conditions of employment and wages.

(3) Through the services of the Unemployment Insurance Commission,

(*a*) provide the principal field representatives of the national emergency manpower authority;

(*b*) prepare and disseminate directives and instructions for the control and allocation of manpower;

(*c*) apply and enforce manpower priorities and controls, and

(*d*) provide local labour market information and analysis.

8. National Defence

(1) Provide technical facilities and operate a system to give warning to the public of the likelihood and imminence of an attack.

(2) Provide technical facilities and operate a system to determine the location and yield of nuclear explosions together with the predicted and actual patterns of fallout, and

(*a*) give the necessary warnings of fallout to the public;

(*b*) prepare preliminary estimates of casualties and weapons effect data from which physical damage or other hazards may be estimated, and

(*c*) co-ordinate and collate nuclear activity data from other available sources.

(3) Provide, maintain and operate a communication system for the national emergency government.

(4) At the request of the regional commissioner, or if communications are not available as may be necessary, control, direct and co-ordinate all survival operations in areas damaged by nuclear explosions or seriously contaminated by radioactive fallout, including

(*a*) the conduct of necessary operations, including rescue, first aid to the injured and decontamination, in these areas;

(*b*) the maintenance of law and order, the control of traffic, and the movement of people;

(*c*) the allotment of firefighting and police tasks;

(*d*) the allotment of tasks for the restoration and maintenance of essential public utilities and services, and

(*e*) during operations the co-ordination of such support as may be required by civil agencies working under the direction or control of the army in these areas.

(5) Provide, as requested, and having regard to other commitments at the time, emergency support to provincial and municipal authorities in the conduct of any survival operations which may be undertaken by these authorities during an emergency.

9. National Health and Welfare

(1) To be responsible through an emergency health services organization for

(*a*) assistance and advice to provincial and municipal governments and other agencies in the operation of emergency medical, nursing, hospital and public health services, and in the health aspects of the provision of potable waters;

(*b*) assistance to provincial and municipal governments in the provision of medical and health supplies from the national medical stockpile;

(*c*) the inspection and regulation of health standards for drug and pharmaceutical manufacture;

(*d*) advice to the war supplies agency in the manufacture, procurement and distribution of medical and health supplies;

(*e*) the establishment of regulations covering the health standards for food and food products including the permissible levels of radioactive contamination;

(*f*) the control and allocation of civilian medical professional manpower, other than members of the Canadian Forces, i.e., physicians, dentists and nurses, and direction or supervision of allied health manpower allocated to emergency health services;

(*g*) medical advice to departments and agencies on the health hazards of radiological, biological and chemical warfare and on general health problems;

(*h*) detailed medical estimates of traumatic and radiation injuries;

(*i*) an estimate of damage to medical installations and an assessment of surviving medical manpower, and

(*j*) the co-ordination of medical mutual support action between the provinces and between Canada and the United States of America.

(2) To be responsible through an emergency welfare services organization, for

(*a*) assistance to provincial and municipal governments in the operation of emergency welfare services, consisting of emergency feeding, clothing, lodging, registration and inquiry, and personal services and without restricting the generality of the foregoing

(i) control and allocate federal welfare material and assigned personnel resources, and

(ii) in consultation with other departments, advise on priority use of essential survival resources, both material and personnel available throughout the country;

(*b*) operating emergency welfare services within a province or provinces where adequate services are not being provided, including the priority requisitioning of accommodation for emergency lodging purposes during the immediate survival phase following a nuclear attack, and

(*c*) co-ordinating welfare mutual support action between the provinces and between Canada and the United States of America.

10. Postmaster General

(1) Operate postal services under emergency conditions.

(2) Distribute and handle emergency change of address and safety notification cards.

11. Public Works

(1) Establish in conjunction with the provincial authorities a wartime organization responsible through central, regional, zonal and local authorities for the control of all accommodation including

(*a*) the use of all existing and useable accommodation, including the requisitioning, appropriation and procurement of property, dwellings, commercial and industrial accommodation, except during the shock phase where these controls may be exercised by emergency welfare services and other emergency government services delegated such authority;

(*b*) rent and sale controls, and

(*c*) the allocation of rehabilitated or newly constructed accommodation.

(2) Through Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation assist the provincial authorities in the general co-ordination and implementation of emergency housing construction programmes, including the provision of the associated water, sewage and other utility services.

(3) Assist the provincial authorities with wartime maintenance and construction programmes for roads and road bridges, and co-ordinate the inter-regional and international aspects of such programmes.

(4) Establish in conjunction with the provincial authorities a wartime organization responsible through central, regional, zonal and local authorities for the control of all engineering and construction resources, except those under the control of military authorities or other exempted emergency government services, including

(*a*) the direction, control and regulation of the engineering resources represented by the equipment, material and assigned manpower of engineering and construction contractors, including the various subtrades and consultant and other engineering services, and of government at all levels except that during the shock phase these controls may be exercised by the Canadian army and other emergency government services delegated such authority;

(*b*) the co-ordination and demands for engineering and construction resources and the allocation of these resources to meet demands which are approved by the executive authority at the appropriate level of government, and

(*c*) the co-ordination of demands on the war supplies agency and the national emergency manpower authority for engineering and construction equipment and manpower.

(5) Establish, in conjunction with other departments and agencies concerned, an organization responsible for the maintenance, repair, reconstruction and construction of all ports, harbours and inland waterway facilities.

(6) These wartime organizations shall not, without the consent of the military authorities or other exempted emergency government services, appropriate or control the use of accommodation buildings, water sewage or other utility service under their control.

12. Transport

(1) Place under federal government control all transportation, meteorological and telecommunications resources, facilities and services in Canada, except those operated by the Department of National Defence and the telecommunications facilities operated by the Department of External Affairs.

(2) Establish and operate an emergency transportation control organization capable of functioning under national, regional, zonal and municipal authorities, as appropriate, to

(*a*) control all types of transportation facilities and services in Canada, including fishing vessels in Canadian waters, but excluding transportation facilities operated by the Department of National Defence, and

(*b*) direct the employment of all types of transportation to essential tasks for the survival of Canada as a nation.

(3) Establish and operate an emergency national telecommunications organization capable of functioning on the basis of decentralized authority to control all forms of telecommunications including broadcasting.

(4) Assess available transportation, meteorological and telecommunications resources, except those operated by the Department of National Defence.

(5) Provide maximum support to tasks accepted by Canada as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(6) Through the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provide an emergency broadcasting service on an international, national and provincial basis over the facilities of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and privately-owned stations including the operation of such facilities as required; such broadcasting to be co-ordinated to meet the general requirements of Canadian and NATO civil emergency plans.

Emergency Measures Organization,
Ottawa, June 12, 1964.

Results to Date

1. A national survival attack warning system is operational and, through sirens and emergency broadcasting, can warn the public.

2. A nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system has a limited operational capability. To complement this system, five provinces are developing a radiation monitoring capability in municipalities.

3. An emergency broadcasting system, involving participation of all radio and TV stations, is in a continuous state of readiness.

4. The army has a re-entry capability with operational plans in readiness.

5. Substantial stocks of emergency health supplies have been procured and are being located in egional depots.

6. The Canadian Civil Defence College has trained, since 1954, over 30,000 persons. Some 2,000 provincial and municipal emergency planners are being trained annually.

7. A public information programme involving press, radio, television and distribution of pamphlets, has been carried out on a continuous basis.

8. A programme of design and development aimed at reducing the costs of shelters is well in hand, and tests are conducted through the DRB.

9. A survey of all federal buildings, some provincial government buildings, and of certain mines has been made to determine their potential as fallout shelters.

10. Approximately 3,000 home shelters are estimated to be in existence but of these only 200 were built using federal financial assistance through the NHA.

11. National exercises, involving provincial and federal components of emergency government, have been conducted.

12. Through the production of planning guides and federal financial assistance, provinces have made steady progress in the development of emergency measures.

13. An urban characteristics survey of all likely target areas has been started.

14. Readiness plans have been prepared for the relocation of government at all levels with the necessary warning, movement and manning orders at the national and regional levels.

15. A national government emergency communications system, based on the Canadian army signal system, is approximately 60 per cent complete.

16. Draft orders-in-council and regulations, defining the authority to be given in wartime to federal agencies have been prepared.

17. Essential records have been selected and stored in emergency quarters.

18. Drafts of departmental war books are now being reviewed within departments, outlining action to be taken under every phase of alert and on the declaration of war.

19. Work has begun on the development of a national system for rapid assessment of damage after attack and determination of surviving resources.

20. A joint study of the effects of a nuclear attack on North America in 1965, on the economies of Canada and of the United States, is in progress.

21. An interim organization has been developed to control all types of supply, for rationing, control of prices, industrial production and external trade.

22. Arrangements have been made for a wartime manpower agency.

23. Plans for the control of all transport and telecommunications facilities are being developed.

24. Plans are being prepared, in co-operation with provinces, for the wartime control of accommodation, engineering and construction resources.

25. Planning is going forward to provide advice to farmers, in co-operation with the provinces, on the protection of farms, crops and livestock, for the inspection of food against radiation and for the control of insects and diseases affecting plants and animals.

26. Provision is being made for catching, landing and processing of fishery products in conjunction with provincial departments.

27. Assistance and guidance to provinces is being provided by national health and welfare in the operation of emergency health services.

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28. Assistance and guidance to provinces is being provided by national health and welfare in their programme to provide lodging, feeding, clothing and other personal services. This programme is well underway in eight provinces.

29. Arrangements have been made for the continuity of minimum postal services.

30. Special plans have been made by the RCMP to help ensure the internal security of the country in wartime.

1964-65

1. Conduct a pilot fallout shelter survey in Alberta in order to develop procedures and techniques should it be considered desirable to carry out a national survey.

2. Continue the shelter research and development programme.

3. Pursue the urban characteristics study.

4. Carry on the operation of the Canadian Civil Defence College with emphasis on training of key officials and staff in their essential duties.

5. Continue to develop, in conjunction with provinces and municipalities, a public information programme, with special emphasis on local disasters.

6. Emphasize the provision of equipment and give guidance for the development of the municipal radiological defence services.

7. Further encourage the development of emergency measures within provinces through the financial assistance programme and planning guides and correlate federal, provincial and local planning.

8. Improve the operational capability of the emergency broadcasting system.

9. Work even more closely with the United States in co-ordinating the respective civil emergency programmes.

10. Further implement the construction programme of emergency headquarters:

(*a*) at central level: provide for another 200 officials with staff in departmental relocation units;

(*b*) at regional level: provide departmental support units to federal and provincial elements of government in 4 regions;

(*c*) at zonal level: provide for 13 additional zone headquarters.

11. Continue evaluation of resources and provide an analysis by regions for a situation 30 days after an attack.

12. Pursue the joint study of effects of a nuclear war on the economies of Canada and of the United States.

13. Further develop the interim capability of a War Supplies Agency, with particular emphasis on operations and responsibilities at the local level.

14. Develop further planning on control of manpower.

15. Prepare more adequate plans for the use of all transport facilities with special emphasis on road transport.

16. Pursue planning for the maximum use of all communications in Canada, and generally to study the feasibility of providing a technical control organization to ensure rapid and effective use of all main commercial telecommunication systems.

17. In co-operation with provinces, continue planning with respect to agriculture and fisheries.

18. Provide further guidance and assistance to provincial emergency health and welfare services, including more implementation of emergency medical stockpiles, hospital disaster planning, surveys of health supplies and medical manpower.

19. Continue assistance, through provinces, to local police forces, continued organization of auxiliary police, and completion of R.C.M.P. emergency network.

20. Progress with planning for the necessary administrative orders and press and radio releases for pre and post-attack situations.

21. Canvass all projects and programmes rigorously in order to determine those most likely to provide peacetime as well as wartime benefits, for example dual-purpose construction serving normal peacetime purposes and fallout shelter if required, and also to determine those plans and projects likely to give worthwhile returns in natural disasters, or in the event of conventional war, as well as under the greater demands of nuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the Minister's statement. I think in questioning the Minister it might be wise to work through his statement, section by section, and then move on to questions in the appendices that go with the statement. I think we should deal in the first section with the general reasons for civil emergency planning; the role and aims of the emergency measures organization; which takes us down to page 3.

Mr. Brewin was first. Do you have a question on this initial part, Mr. Brewin?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, I have a few questions. First of all, I would like to call the Minister's attention to what is said here as one of the grounds for saying civil preparations should be carried out, and it is said that U.S. defence secretary McNamara says the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system in saving lives depends in a large part upon the existence of an adequate civil defence system, and again, that the recommendation of production and employment of anti-ICBM systems will be entirely contingent upon acceptance by the congress of a satisfactory fall-out shelter program.

Now, first of all, am I not correct, Mr. Drury, in assuming that at present at any rate the American government has decided not to proceed with an anti-ballistic missile system, on the grounds largely that the expense would be prohibitive?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think the present situation is that there has been a great deal of developmental work done on an anti-ICBM system. This has led to a system which is very expensive, as you have mentioned, and rather than proceed to install the presently developed system, Mr. McNamara and the administration would hope to continue developmental work, with a view to making it more economical, less expensive, to install and operate, having in mind always that an occasion may arise when even the present very high level of expense might have to be assumed if the emergency appeared to warrant it.

Mr. BREWIN: Then may I put the converse to the proposition here? Without an adequate anti-ballistic missile system, would not a shelter program be almost useless, because of the fact that the fall-out shelter system would not protect against blast and fire?

Do the two not necessarily go together?

Mr. DRURY: No, blast shelter and an ICBM system have a direct relationship, obviously, one to the other.

If you are able to prevent a blast taking place, you do not need blast shelters. If you have no means of preventing a blast occurring, then an argument can be made for the necessity of blast shelters. However, in either case, as Mr. McNamara makes clear, with or without an ICBM system, there will be a fall-out problem, and the degree of protection which an anti-ICBM system, at very great expense, would provide would be largely rendered useless, or wasteful, if at the same time the consequences of this protective system could not be kept from the general public through fall-out shelters.

Mr. BREWIN: Yes, but I was trying to make the point that a fall-out shelter as such is no protection against blast. There are two things, are there not, a blast shelter and a fall-out shelter?

Mr. DRURY: Correct, they are quite different.

Mr. BREWIN: Perhaps in that connection I might come over to appendix 2, but it relates to this. There is a statement in item 10 on appendix 2 that approximately 3,000 home shelters are estimated to be in existence, but of these only 200 were built using federal financial assistance through the National Housing Act.

Now, I appreciate that in addition to that there are federal buildings, and other things, other than home shelters.

Is there any estimate of the capacity to absorb personnel of the other buildings, other than home shelters?

Mr. DRURY: As yet there is no estimate. I do not think there is probably even a guess.

As I mentioned at the end of my statement, one of the things we are doing now is to develop measuring or surveying techniques—with the co-operation of the government of Alberta—with respect to measuring or surveying, with a view to fall-out protection, all public buildings in Alberta. The object of this is to try and develop a satisfactory method of measuring and cataloguing all public buildings in Canada, with a view to determining what is available, and what the capacity would be, but we have not yet got the answer to your question.

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Drury, would you not agree that the provision of 3,000 home shelters, 200 of which were built with the assistance of the N.H.A. is totally inadequate if there is to be any serious attempt to provide shelters which would have any real meaning in the case of a nuclear war?

Mr. DRURY: Manifestly 3,000 home shelters is not going to do very much to protect a population of some 18 million against fall-out. I do not think there is any question about this.

The provision of home shelters to be constructed at the owner's expense has not in the past proved to be attractive on the basis of encouragement, exhortation, and the provision of plans by the public authorities.

The alternative to it being done at his expense is to do it at public expense, and this would entail on the part of the government for huge sums of money.

It is for this reason that we are proceeding to ascertain what might be the capacity of, not homes, but public buildings across Canada.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I do not want to monopolize the questioning. I am sure others have questions, but I

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would like to finish up by saying that is it not misleading in fact to pretend that without vast expenditure of money we can provide defence against nuclear warfare, any substantial protection?

Mr. DRURY: We can with modest expense, I think, provide defence against some of the aspects or effects of nuclear war. Now, I think this is hardly my field, but I understand that in your discussion of defence policy, it has been made clear that a massive attack, direct attack, on Canada itself is not very likely, not very probable, and the principal thing which Canada as a whole—I am not talking about specific areas, but as a whole—has to be on guard against is fall-out.

Mr. BREWIN: Well, I do not think, if I may comment on your observation, that we got the impression, at least I did not, that Canadian centres of population would be immune. We got the impression that Canada would not be attacked alone, but if you envisage an attack on North America, surely some Canadian centres might call for some attention, and in this event would have much more than fall-out to worry about.

Mr. DRURY: In those centres?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: And I tried to make that point, that in these particular possible target areas, obviously one has to worry about more than fall-out. The only protection against this kind of attack is destruction of the attacking weapon. It is impracticable, I think most people have agreed, impracticable to try and construct a shelter which will be immune to direct attack. I say impracticable in terms of cost, not of technological capability, but impracticable in terms of cost, certainly for a country like ours, but at the same time, through intelligent organization of existing buildings, and particularly large public buildings, with comparatively little expense in the way of provision of additional facilities, it should be possible to prepare a fairly large measure of protection against fall-out, which represents in terms of population numbers, the largest threat. It poses the threat to the greater number of people in Canada.

Mr. BREWIN: I wonder if I might ask just one more question. Is it not true that as you provide a shelter program, countermeasures are likely to be provided equally quickly?

In other words, are you not running a race that you can never win?

Mr. DRURY: In respect to fall-out shelters?

Mr. BREWIN: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: I do not think so, no. To the best of my knowledge there has been no modification of these explosive weapons designed to make fall-out either more lethal or more penetrating, or to overcome the kind of protection which a fall-out shelter provides.

Mr. BREWIN: I will provide you later with an article I have, indicating that the bulletin on atomic science does not agree with your conclusion.

Mr. HARKNESS: First of all, I would like to ask Mr. Drury is the cabinet committee on emergency measures organization still in operation?

Mr. DRURY: It is still in operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: And that continues to be, really, the chief co-ordinating body for getting all departments of government worked into the emergency measures organization scheme?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is one of the centres of co-ordination, that is correct. When you say chief, I am not quite sure how you measure co-ordination.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, with the large number of departments which are directly involved in this, and at least half a dozen who have to play a major part in any effective scheme, it seems to me a committee of that kind is perhaps essential in order to bring their activities into any reasonable working arrangement.

Mr. DRURY: I would agree with this, and this is the obvious reason why the body has been continued, and is continuing in operation, continuing to function.

Mr. HARKNESS: And is the annual conference on emergency measures with the provinces still taking place?

Mr. DRURY: I do not know. There has been a formal annual conference, has there?

Mr. PAUL FAGUY (*Director, Emergency Measures Organization*): Not in the past year, sir, but it is intended. We hope that there will be one, sir.

Mr. HARKNESS: There is no definite date set for that meeting?

Mr. DRURY: No.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would suggest that this is one of the essentials as far as co-ordinating the federal government's activities and the provincial and municipal governments' activities.

It always seemed to me, when I had responsibility for these operations, that this was the only means by which we made progress in co-ordinating the provincial and federal governments.

Mr. DRURY: I agree with you, this is a very useful step and as Mr. Faguy has mentioned, it is planned to continue with this type of collaboration and co-operation.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would hope that there might be some definite date set for that, and the committee might be informed of that before the present session is over.

I regret to hear that there has been no conference since, I presume, the last one I presided over, which will be two years this coming December.

Mr. DRURY: Well, there has not been one, I know, since April, 1963, and I am not sure of the last date previous.

Mr. HARKNESS: The last one I know of, I think, was in December, 1962.

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, December 29, sir.

Mr. DRURY: We did miss in the calendar year, 1963. I would hope that we would not miss in the calendar year 1964.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, I would have just observed, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee might recommend that this conference be held in the fairly near future.

Now, on the first page of your presentation you have a statement from the white paper, the future priority to be assigned to civil defence measures will be influenced greatly by the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system.

I cannot see, myself, why that is. What effect will the decision to deploy or not to deploy an anti-ICBM system have on the extent to which you carry on emergency measures?

Mr. DRURY: Well, an active effective defence against attack will call for, or have a direct relationship on the kind of things that are done in respect of civil defence.

Mr. HARKNESS: Why?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I do not think there is much doubt that an effective active defence alters, or is likely to alter, the character of the attack, and if the probable character of attack is one kind, the appropriate passive or civil defence measures would be of one kind, and if one contemplates a different type of attack, you should have different civil defence priorities.

Mr. HARKNESS: Can you give us an example which would illustrate this?

Mr. DRURY: I think probably if one were to take, by way of example, a large urban agglomeration in Canada, if there were no effective means of stopping the descent on to it of a guided or a ballistic missile, the plans for minimizing the damage to that population would, of course, be quite different from the plans that one would develop for minimizing damage to the population if there were an effective means of preventing the descent of a missile on to that same area.

Now, in one case, if there is no defence, one possible means of minimizing the damage is evacuation. If, however, you are in a reasonable position to ensure that there will be no descent, then evacuation does not enter into it as a likely, or even a probable means of dealing with means of minimizing damage.

Mr. HARKNESS: Well, what this amounts to, really, is, is it not, that if you have a guarantee that there will be no nuclear weapons discharged in this country, then you do not need any civil defence at all, or emergency measures set up, but there is no possibility that that situation will ever be reached.

Mr. DRURY: Well, let me deal with the first premise. I would not agree that the guarantee of no nuclear explosions on Canadian cities would do away with the need for emergency measures planning, and emergency measures organization.

There will still, even with an effective theoretical defence, be problems of fall-out arising from either detonations on the surface in Canada in non-populated areas and detonations on the surface in the United States. Both of these will produce a fall-out danger, a fall-out problem, in Canada.

Mr. HARKNESS: But is not the actual situation the same in this regard as it has been down through the ages in regard to any weapon? No perfect defence has ever been evolved against any weapon, and it is beyond the bounds of credibility that any perfect defence will be evolved against ICBM's, or other means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, is not the situation that we have to accept that some weapons in the event of a war of that type developing will land in this continent, and therefore we are going to have the emergency measures program, or the necessity for it, always with us.

This is why I do not understand this phrase here that it is going to depend on whether an ICBM system is put in or not. In my view, I think you have to have this emergency measures organization, the arrangements for continuity of government, the arrangements for trying to ensure that as many as possible of your population survive, irrespective of the defence which is evolved against ICBM's.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think perhaps the phrase that you have quoted may not have been—

Mr. HARKNESS: It is not a very happy phrase, I would say.

Mr. DRURY: —as lucid. What was meant was rather not that the continuation or otherwise of civil defence measures will depend, but that the priorities within civil defence will change, depending on whether or not there is an effective anti-ICBM system.

I agree heartily with you that regardless of whether we have this, we must have—

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree that there might be a difference in emphasis depending on how effective an ICBM defence you think you have, but it would be just a difference of emphasis. It would not materially alter what you have got in the way of emergency measures organization.

Mr. DRURY: I agree heartily.

Mr. HARKNESS: Now, on this question that Mr. Brewin raised in connection with the blast protection, fall-out protection, home shelters, and so on.

Is not the situation this, that as far as any area where a direct hit is concerned, you are going to have any centre of that area, depending on the size of the warhead which is dropped there, an area of total destruction. It would not matter what degree of blast protection you put in. You would have nothing left anyway, and therefore you are in a situation where not only from the financial point of view, but from the practical point of view, it is not much use trying to provide blast protection except for a very limited number of, we will say, government headquarters, where you would hope there

would not be an absolute direct hit, and therefore the headquarters would be able to survive and operate.

Mr. DRURY: That is correct.

Mr. HARKNESS: On the other hand, fall-out may take place, and in the event of a nuclear war, it probably would take place everywhere in the country, and therefore there is every argument for providing fall-out protection, more or less universally.

Well, has the government at the present time any program of encouraging to a greater degree than has been the case up to date the building of home shelters?

Mr. DRURY: There are no plans for doing anything more in respect of home shelters than has been done in the past.

There is a continuing development program, the purpose of which is to try to devise for the home owner the most satisfactory, easiest, and the most economical methods of him providing for himself, and at his own expense, modifications to his own home, to provide a reasonable measure of fall-out protection, and a continuation of the program to make this information readily available to home owners all the way across Canada, but it is not contemplated at the present time that there will be any extension of this limited program by way of direct financial assistance to home owners, or the provision of material, or items at government expense to home owners.

Mr. HARKNESS: Yes, well, I think myself it is very regrettable that the efforts which were made in the way of putting out pamphlets, and so on, which were put out in very large numbers, outlining how a cheap home shelter could be constructed, and encouraging people to put in the home shelters, did not meet with more success.

As you have pointed out here, the number of people who will build a shelter is really related directly to a crisis developing. As soon as a crisis begins, people start building shelters, and as soon as the crisis is over, everyone forgets about it.

I recognize that it is a very difficult problem to get practical results on.

Now, in that connection, is any consideration being given at the present time to a scheme which was designed to encourage this, and which was under active consideration some two years ago, of the houses owned by the government? A large number of them are Department of National Defence houses, of course, but there are also Department of Transport, and Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, which have housing owned by the government. The scheme was to build fall-out shelters in any new construction, and to put them into construction already existing, and there was no final decision made on that the last that I was concerned with it, but it was under very active consideration, and in fact it was almost agreed to at one time.

What is the situation of that program at the present time?

Mr. DRURY: It is not under active consideration at this time.

If I may make an observation on this, such a program would have as its objective either the provision, as its end object, the provision of a limited number of fall-out shelters, at government expense, to a selected group of people, and this, I think, would perhaps be rather unfair, in that those who happened to be occupying government-owned quarters would have at public expense, personal fall-out shelters, whereas the vast bulk of the population would not.

There is, therefore, in such an arrangement some element of inequality, if this were to be the object of installing these in government-owned quarters.

If the object, however, is to serve as an example, or an encouragement, to the general public to emulate it, I myself would have very serious doubts as to the effectiveness of setting this kind of example. I think it would likely lead, in the present state of the general public's view of the international situation, to no more being done than has been done by home owners now under the present state of exhortation, and this type of example, I do not think would materially increase the numbers of private owners who are prepared to take it on their own.

The CHAIRMAN: If I might interrupt just a moment, I have six other questioners. I have been arbitrarily trying to work it out on the basis of about ten minutes each so that everyone would have an equal chance to question.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would agree that the argument in connection with this revolved around the points which you have just mentioned, but it seems to me that if the government does not provide fall-out shelters in housing which it owns and operates itself, it is pretty difficult to persuade the general public, the individual, that he should put one in his own place.

In other words, I do not think there is any chance at all of very many individuals putting in fall-out shelters, unless they do have an example of this sort provided for them, if the government takes the matter sufficiently seriously that they provide fall-out shelters in houses owned by themselves.

Mr. DRURY: I certainly agree with that proposition, that unless the government sets the example it is unlikely that the public will take the lead. There is not much disputing that.

However, I still think that even if the government were to set the example, at this juncture it would not be followed.

Mr. HARKNESS: But will you not agree that if the government does not set an example of this kind, you might just as well forget about the fall-out shelter program?

Mr. DRURY: Rather than forget about it, I would rather that for the time being the emergency measures organization should limit itself to endeavours to develop the most effective economic means of modifying homes to provide fall-out protection, and to disseminate this

information to the public interested in it, and when the general atmosphere appears to be more receptive, more likely to be receptive, to the notion of fall-out shelters in homes constructed at the owner's expense, then would be a more appropriate time for setting the example.

In the meantime, I do think that the emergency measures organization should continue to do what it can in the provision of fall-out protection in public buildings, buildings at all levels of government.

Mr. HARKNESS: I would like later, when some other people have talked, to come back to this matter of the provision of public shelters.

At this particular point, I would just like to make this final observation. It seems to me, then, that the government has adopted the same attitude as that of the general population, that the international situation is not such that it really warrants the expenditure of the funds required for fall-out shelters in its own houses.

Mr. DRURY: In homes, that is correct, but one must distinguish between fall-out shelters in homes, and fall-out shelters provided in public buildings.

Apart from anything else, on a per capita basis, per capita protection, the provision of fall-out shelters in public buildings is very much cheaper than the cost per head to protect in a home.

Mr. FANE: You would not have any trouble getting them built as soon as the first ICBM lands.

Mr. BREWIN: That would be a little bit too late.

Mr. SMITH: A few months ago, an American nuclear physicist was on a television program in Toronto, and in answer to questions very much like Mr. Brewin's questions to you today, sir, he made these points: that since an enemy attack would be for the purpose of conquest, they would want to conquer as much of the country as they could in a viable state; that they would be likely to direct the main attack towards vital targets; and that since few of these vital targets were in Canada, and most of them were in the United States, he suggested that civilian defence and survival training was more possible, and more likely to be effective, in Canada, and therefore was more important for Canada than the United States.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. DRURY: Well, I would agree with what I take to be the general proposition.

Mr. SMITH: That our survival chances are better?

Mr. DRURY: Our survival chances are better in the event of a massive attack, and one is talking about probabilities in all these cases, our survival chances are better, and the kind of threat we face is more easily countered than would be the probable threat to the population of the United States.

Mr. SMITH: So, therefore, survival steps in Canada are probably more worth while than they are in many parts of the United States?

Mr. DRURY: Well, let me put it another way, which perhaps says the same thing. For a dollar invested in this field, we in Canada are likely to secure more survivability than a dollar invested in the United States would provide.

Mr. SMITH: Therefore, with our survival in Canada, it does not necessarily follow that we should follow the lead, or the lack of lead, which is given by the United States, whose problem is considerably different from ours.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I do think that there should be some relationship between the steps taken by the United States and the steps taken by ourselves, but that the emphasis we place on one form of emergency measures may well be quite different from the emphasis placed by the United States on the same form, or on the relative forms.

Now, I think what you are suggesting is that if the United States goes all out on emergency measures, or civil defence, we should not necessarily follow right along in their trail, and conversely what you do argue, perhaps a little more strongly, is that merely because the United States does nothing is no reason why we should be doing nothing.

Well, you must look at the other side of the coin, too, and if one is true, so is the other. I would agree with you that a dollar spent in Canada is likely to produce more survivability than a dollar spent in the United States. You must remember, however, that what we are contemplating here is basically a form of insurance against a contingent event, having in mind that if the United States takes out no insurance at all against this risk, that is perhaps not a compelling reason that we should take none.

On the other hand, if the United States is prepared to invest very heavily now in this kind of insurance, one must bear in mind that we in Canada can get the same insurance coverage for considerably less cost.

Mr. SMITH: A minute ago you spoke of the difference of emphasis. Would it be a fair conclusion that you think the emphasis in Canada perhaps should be on fall-out shelters, rather than blast shelters?

Mr. DRURY: Precisely.

Mr. SMITH: And one or two final questions on this curiously muddled sentence in the white paper. There is no assurance, or guarantee, that any anti-ICBM system will work until it has been tried.

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a generality.

Mr. SMITH: Well, there is no assurance that any defence system will work until it has been tried.

Mr. DRURY: We could say that there is no assurance anything will work until it has been tried.

Mr. SMITH: Yes.

Mr. DRURY: All right. I will not argue that too much.

Mr. SMITH: So, just to make it perfectly clear, your feeling is that the effect of the deployment of an anti-ICBM system by the United States will not be whether

or not we will have survival training and emergency measures organization set up, but only the direction.

Mr. DRURY: The kind of direction, that is right.

Mr. MACRAE: My questions have to do with Order in Council P.C. 1963-993, and I would ask the minister if that is, as listed here, is that the order in council complete, all that particular one which actually designates the Minister of Defence Production as the responsible minister, and then spells out certain duties. Is that order in council complete here, or are there others?

Mr. DRURY: When you say complete, do you ask if this particular order in council is an outline, or tell the whole story?

Mr. MACRAE: Yes?

Mr. DRURY: The answer is no. It is a complete order in council. It has got a heading, and a date, and a signature.

Mr. MACRAE: I do not mean about the formalities, but in the body of it. Is that in here?

Mr. DRURY: No, this is an order in council under the public service rearrangements and transfer of duties acts, and it merely transfers to the Minister of Defence Production the responsibility for the emergency measures organization.

Now, the order in council which is the basic one establishing the organization itself is the 1959 order in council.

Mr. MACRAE: Then the second question, have there been other orders in council, other than this one of 1959, and this one of 1963 in connection with this? Are there others?

Mr. DRURY: None directly relating to the emergency measures organization. There have been general orders in council, covering the whole of the government service, and so on, which have a bearing on the emergency measures organization, or the personnel within it, but not specifically related to the emergency measures organization.

Mr. MACRAE: Well, my final question, Mr. Chairman, what changes have been made in the whole basic plan of the emergency measures since you took over, Mr. Drury? Are there any, or are you in effect—and perhaps a brief answer here is all that is required—are you in effect carrying on the plan as it was set up before 1963?

Mr. DRURY: Carrying on the organization which was in existence prior to 1963, and with the kinds of change in emphasis which I have indicated in my outline remarks, the program which has been evolving gradually since 1959.

Mr. MACRAE: So there have been no basic changes, other than in emphasis?

Mr. DRURY: There have been no basic changes in direction.

Mr. GROOS: I wanted to ask the minister a few questions on the matter of co-ordination and co-operation with the United States.

I recall when we visited NORAD, at Colorado Springs, there was a very close liaison between their civil defence organization and the North American air defence organization. They were both in the same building, and their job seemed to be largely centred around providing early warning of the point of impact of ICBM's, and in providing confirmation, through various sensors, and so forth, that the impact had taken place in that area.

I notice that there were a number of these sensors spread all over the United States, but they did not extend up into Canada, and this seems to suggest to me a very great gap, a very dangerous gap, and I could not quite see the reasoning behind this.

It suggests to me a very legitimate field for civil defence planning, and I was going to ask the minister if our defence plans, or our civil defence plans, include closer co-operation with the United States, and perhaps an extension of these sensors up into Canada, because it seems to me that it is an over-all problem, and not just one that is confined to the United States.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I think most members of the committee will be pretty familiar with the co-operative arrangements which NORAD represents, and as you remarked there is in the NORAD headquarters a United States civil defence unit, and there is a link between the United States air forces and the United States civil defence organization, not only at the level of the NORAD headquarters, but at United States air defence subordinate headquarters.

The same organization obtains in Canada, and there is the same chain of command and information on the civil side that there is on the military. At North Bay there is the same arrangement for co-operation and inter-communication between the military in the North Bay headquarters and the Canadians in the civil defence organization, and even at subordinate Canadian headquarters there is the same crossover.

I would suggest that while there may be in some areas differences in either the type or scales of equipment provided for civil defence in certain regions of the United States and regions in Canada, the general organization, the general level of activity is intended to be substantially the same.

Because of the over-all part played by the Canadian army in civil defence, and I mention in my statement that national defence is responsible for the construction and operation of the main governmental regional headquarters, there is a representative of the Canadian army at Colorado Springs. It is the headquarters of NORAD, and he is the liaison between the NORAD command directly through to the Canadian element.

Mr. GROOS: Well, that partly answers my question, Mr. Chairman, and I can understand that there is complete co-operation in so far as we in Canada could

be warned through the United States, and by using their computers of the projected impact area of these ICBM's, but it seems to me that the thing that is lacking is the method of confirming that the missiles actually have fallen in this area, and of course this very much affects our problem in so far as we are interested in fall-out, and we must know exactly where, and in some area that is not too highly populated these missiles have fallen, so I really was interested in finding out whether we have any plans for providing these sensors in this country.

Mr. DRURY: Well, we have, as they have in the United States, an organization and system of reporting the location of detonations, and reporting on fall-out.

Now, these will vary as to how continuous and how extensive on a full time basis such an organization should be.

We now have the skeleton of such an organization, and part of the continuing growth or improvement of the emergency measures organization includes the improvement of the communications of this particular group for locating and reporting of nuclear detonations.

Mr. GROOS: One last question, then, Mr. Chairman. Is this organization and this system that we have completely coupled in with that of the United States, and if so, why would it not have been shown down there in NORAD?

Mr. DRURY: Well now, why it was not shown down there, I do not know. There is a Canadian system. There is provision for cross-linking the exchange of information at every level as between the NORAD regional headquarters and as between the NORAD stations, on a north-south basis, and our nuclear detonation reporting system is linked to, and works with the United States system.

Now, why it was not displayed, I frankly do not know.

Mr. MCNULTY: Mr. Drury, I wonder whether you could give us the approximate annual cost of the E.M.O. to Canada?

Mr. DRURY: The annual appropriation is of the order of $10 million. This does not include expenditures made from the appropriations for their own sort of specialities of other government departments.

By way of example, the Department of National Defence, the Department of National Health and Welfare, the Department of Defence Production, the Canadian broadcasting corporation.

But for the emergency organization itself, in the accomplishment of the purposes I have outlined here, the annual appropriation has been running in the order of $10 million.

Mr. HARKNESS: Could I ask a supplementary question? Is it not that most of the expenditures for the emergency measures organization have been borne by the Department of National Defence?

Mr. DRURY: In the past this has been true, and these expenditures have been related principally to the provision of capital facilities. The large complex to provide an alternative to Ottawa for the operations of the government, the similar, but smaller scale headquarters in the regions, and the provision of capital equipment for inter-communication. It is quite true.

Mr. MCNULTY: Do you have any idea of the total cost, taking into consideration the amount budgeted for the other departments?

Mr. DRURY: On an annual basis, or since 1959?

Mr. BREWIN: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could interrupt, and refer the minister to this document in our folders, called E.M.O. National Digest, December, 1963, and the figures are given at page five of this.

This is the answer he gave in the house to a question that was asked him.

Have you seen this? I do not know whether it is accurate or not, but I think it answers the question.

Mr. DRURY: This does give a summary, yes, and I had better not offer any figures that are perhaps less accurate than these.

The approximate expenditures over the last six years, for all departments are: 57-58, 4.1 million; 58-59, 4.1 million; 59-60, 15.6 million; 60-61, 26.2 million; 61-62, 69.8 million; 62-63, 40.8 million; for a total of 160.6 million, since 1957-58.

Mr. MCNULTY: What would the approximate cost be for the average family fall-out shelter?

Mr. DRURY: In a home?

Mr. MCNULTY: In a home, yes.

Mr. DRURY: It is hard to be precise about this, but a simple home constructed fall-out shelter should be obtainable for about $500.

Mr. MCNULTY: How much of this would be government subsidy?

Mr. DRURY: In terms of direct financial assistance, nothing. There is an element of subsidy in the cost to the government of development work, to work out the plans, and the tests to ensure the usefulness of such plans, and there is also the possibility of obtaining for this purpose a loan from C.H.M.C.

Mr. MCNULTY: Does this come under their winter building program?

Mr. DRURY: When you ask do they come under, there would be no bar to a man securing the bonus for winter construction by reason of building a fall-out shelter in his house, but it would not alter the amount of the bonus.

Mr. MCNULTY: Have members of parliament ever had a practice exercise in the emergency movement of the government, and how successful was it, if they did?

Mr. DRURY: Success, of course, is I suppose a relative term. This has been practised on a number of occasions, with a satisfactory result.

Mr. MCNULTY: When was the last time?

Mr. DRURY: The last time this was done was in 1961.

Mr. SMITH: Members of parliament have a pretty low priority in this, do they not? There are other people more important.

Mr. DRURY: Well, when you say pretty low, they have a lower priority than those whose job, or whose presence is important to the continuity of an executive function.

Mr. LANIEL: Mr. Chairman, the field of questions has narrowed down quite a bit. I have been asking myself, and I still do, about the co-operation that the federal government receives from lower levels of government, and the result that it gives, actually.

I know it is purely a matter of education, and you do not give to the people something that they do not ask for, and with the sayings that we hear here and there, that a nuclear war is impossible, and people say well, we will have to chance that. It might not come, and why spend money, but I wanted to ask how much the emergency measure planning has been costing in the past year?

The figures did not impress me too much, because I say to myself the federal government has to take the initiative, and it does in the field of national defence, actually. We spend billions of dollars to defend and protect the population against an attack, or to stop wars, and all that, and I do not think we do our share in dollars and cents to protect the population against the threat of nuclear war, which is a possibility, a future possibility.

I do not want to put this as a question, but I think in my views, and I am just preparing the field for my main question, I feel that the federal government should do more, and should do more to protect the population, and educate the population, and I wanted to ask a question of you, sir, what would be your opinion about, let us say, an adjustment of my proposal of compulsory service, into a sort of home guards organization, which would give you a good field, the E.M.O. field, around which you may adjust your organization, this compulsory service for the people of Canada, and at the same time educate the young people, which would go back to their families, and would educate the population in general, and maybe would make the population more conscious of their responsibility in that field, and at the same time it would help this country quite a lot.

What do you think of that?

Mr. DRURY: I would certainly say that it is much more imaginative, much more, in my view anyhow, useful, to have national service conducted under the, if you like, main purpose of emergency measures, or civil defence, than it is under the aegis, or having as its purpose the teaching of young people to bear arms.

Mr. LANIEL: I am moving towards that direction. That is why I asked you that question.

Mr. DRURY: This would seem to be a much better banner under which to launch such a proposal, I agree with that, but of course one of the serious obstacles to any scheme of national service, for whatever purpose it might be, or under whatever heading it might be, is the question of cost, and whether this is the most important area to which the efforts of a very large segment of the Canadian people should be directed for, I agree, a relatively short period of their life, and in terms of the acceptable use of our total national resources, this would represent a large diversion from the present allocation of the national resources.

Mr. LANIEL: Yes, but sir, when you know that we have spent $700 million up north to protect this country about something which may never come, and might be obsolete soon, would it be worth while to look into the possibility of spending $250 million a year for such an eventuality, which would have a much broader field?

Mr. DRURY: Well now, again this is not entirely my field, but the purpose of national defence expenditure is not to protect people in the sense, I think, that you have been using it.

The purpose of this expenditure is to, in so far as we are able, ensure that this event does not take place.

On the other hand, the purpose of emergency measures expenditure is quite different. It is to protect people should the event take place, and you cannot really regard both of these expenditures being directed toward the same object. They are not, they are directed to quite different objects. One is protection in the event of something happening, and the other, the national defence expenditures, are directed at preventing that event happening, not to protect people from the consequences of the event, but to prevent the event happening.

Now, one can argue that not as useful a purpose is being served by spending large sums of money in preventing nuclear war, and we would be better off spending money to make Canadians more fit to prosper in a world where there was no nuclear war, but this kind of expenditure would not serve, I suggest, to represent our part in preventing a nuclear war happening. This would be a complete change of object from the present one, but certainly if we are going to have any kind of national services scheme, this is a much better basis, philosophical basis, for launching it, than training people to bear arms.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Lessard, we have an interpreter present, if you prefer to speak in French.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) I have four short questions. Do the national building standards include standards for protection, as well as durability?

Would there be any possibility of a religious organization building a church, say, in a city, and providing in the basement some form of protection?

Would there be standards to cover that, to provide a fall-out shelter in the basement, and if so, would there be any form of financial assistance available?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) Yes, if, suppose that religious communities do wish to concern themselves with this matter, then there will be assistance available for them, in the form of standards, and technical advice, but when it come to financing, that is where we stop.

(*Text*)

I might add, we hope they would avail themselves of this advice.

Mr. BREWIN: May I give a theological supplement, Mr. Chairman?

Might not they be better upstairs on their knees, rather than bothering to get down into the basement?

Mr. LANIEL: Are you looking to such an eventuality as having grants available?

Mr. DRURY: Not at the moment. As I mentioned, what we are now doing is to try and work towards surveying all existing capacity, and getting a measure of what is needed to make these useful as fall-out shelters.

If, by some unlikely event, there is already existing in Canada sufficient to take care of all our needs, then no further development would be needed. Now, this is only theoretically possible.

Mr. LANIEL: You would not build churches just to make shelters.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) A subway is being built at Montreal, and one has been in existence in Toronto for a number of years. I would like to know if when the construction of these subways was undertaken, the federal government took any steps to provide for their use, in the event of necessity, as underground shelters?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) At the time of the construction of the subway in Toronto, and with the present construction of the subway in Montreal, attempts were made to interest the constructors in the provision of shelter facilities, but without too much success.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) Was that owing to the fact that you did not wish to make any financial contribution?

(*Text*)

Mr. DRURY: Precisely.

Mr. SMITH: Is it not a fact that, though, that the subways, as they are built, would have a reasonable, or a considerable amount of easy convertibility into fall-out shelters?

Mr. DRURY: Well, some elements of some subways.

Mr. SMITH: I mean, the mere fact of their depth in some cases.

Mr. DRURY: The subway in Toronto, for instance, spends a lot of its time either on the surface, or very close to it.

One must bear in mind that what one is looking at, is not protection against a relatively short downpour. It is not like getting in out of the rain. It is not too difficult to find in a number of places in Canada shelter, immediate shelter from fall-out. The problem, basically, is how to exist for some time in this particular environment.

Now, just a plain, ordinary hole in the ground would provide you with the necessary mass barrier between you and whatever the fall-out there may be, and as long as you remain in that hole, you would be protected, but one has to look beyond the mere problems of a shield, to surviving for as long as may be necessary.

Now, in the case of the subways, some of them anyhow, are large underground caverns; there is a lot of physical space, but if people are going to remain and survive in here, all kinds of things, principally sanitation, and the provision of air, fresh air, and fresh water, are needed, and in some ways these kinds of services are not easily provided or readily available in the case of subway tunnels. It could be more economically done in the basement of a large building, which already has sanitation and water facilities in it.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): (*Interpretation*) First of all, I am sorry that the federal government missed a good opportunity to make a financial contribution to what might have been useful shelter facilities, and now a question regarding the Saguenay region.

You make reference in your document to certain storage centres, where food, first aid supplies, and drugs, and so forth, are kept.

Do any such storage centres exist in the Saguenay region?

Mr. DRURY: (*Interpretation*) These storage centres contain only drugs, medicines, clothes, but no food and no supplies of any other kind.

At the present time, the stocks for the Quebec region are in Valcartier, and there is no such storage centre for Saguenay area.

(*Text*)

Mr. FANE: Just working on the premise that we have to have somebody locally to organize the E.M.O., that in my mind is something that should come first.

I want to know who in the places where reserve units of the Canadian forces have been disbanded is taking over that duty, if any?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a very large question, covering quite a few localities, and the answer will tend to vary with the locality.

I might say that the role of the reserve forces has been to provide, within the whole emergency measures framework, specific services and specific functions, but they have not been responsible, as such, for the emergency measures organization.

This is quite a separate hierarchy, and is organized a bit like the armed forces, on the basis of a central apparatus, largely devoted to planning, in Ottawa, with the federal government, and a further chain extending

through the provincial governments, and finally a municipal, a modest municipal organization.

Now, involved in the municipal organization will be a co-ordinator of civil defence, in the municipalities where we have succeeded in persuading them to establish such an office, and his job is to co-ordinate all the municipal functions whose services would be useful and usable in the event of either a nuclear or indeed a civilian disaster, and the disbanding of a reserve force will not affect this organization.

There may be a gap in certain functions which the military within that municipality, within that locality, would have been called upon to perform.

Mr. FANE: Would it not provide a very serious gap in the organization that could be definitely controlled, because nobody can control a civilian organization as well as a military, or semimilitary organization can be controlled.

Mr. DRURY: Well, I am an old time democrat. I cannot subscribe entirely as to the virtues of military control. I do not think that there is any question about it. In time of emergency the military tend to be more disciplined, to be more coherent, to be better organized, and as a consequence, perhaps, better able to carry out a specific function, and this, indeed, has been the role of the reserve forces.

Now, where a reserve force unit has had a specific role, or specific function, to carry out, and this reserve unit is being disbanded, some means will have to be found for the effective discharge of the role, or the function previously allocated to that unit, but I would point out that there are areas in Canada where there is a civil defence organization, and a plan evolved, for emergency measures and where there are no military units.

Mr. FANE: That is more or less what I was trying to say, in my own inarticulate way.

However, I have one more question, which has to do with the first item in your appendix 1, that is agriculture.

Just how, and where, and in what way, are agricultural products that can be used for food going to be protected, and in a usable form, should a nuclear attack occur?

Mr. DRURY: It would be very expensive indeed to try to provide a protected four or five months supply of food for the whole Canadian population. Not only would this require an awful lot of space, it would also involve very substantial carrying charges, and further, it would involve the problems of turnover, and waste involved in this turnover, and this may go on for years, and years, and years.

Because of the difficulties inherent in this kind of stockpiling on a protected basis, the emergency measures organization has directed its efforts rather at devising machinery to ascertain, as rapidly as possible, the surviving food, and the surviving sources of food, and prepare to make the most efficient and the most effective utilization of what remains, rather than to actually protect the whole.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the list of questioners. There were still some outstanding questions.

Next Tuesday, Mr. Faguy will be the witness. If anybody would have further questions they would like to direct towards the minister, he could be back. Mr. Brewin and Mr. Harkness would like to direct further questions to the minister.

This committee stands adjourned, then, until Tuesday, at 11 o'clock.

TUESDAY, June 23, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN: We have a quorum. Come to order, please. We are continuing this morning with our discussion respecting E.M.O. The Hon. Mr. Drury, the Minister of Defence Production, and Mr. Faguy, the director of E.M.O. are present as witnesses. There are no prepared statements this morning, so we shall proceed with the questioning of the witnesses. The first questioner is Mr. Fane.

Mr. FANE: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Harkness asked me to say that he was called away, and that he would not at this time be able to ask questions of which he had given notice. But there is one question I would like to ask the minister, and that is: How is it that the Emergency Measures Organization reports to the Minister of Defence Production rather than to the Minister of National Defence?

Hon. C. M. DRURY (*Minister of Defence Production*): The choice of ministers or the choice of minister to be responsible for civil defence measures is obviously a question of judgment, and whether it be the Minister of National Defence or another minister will depend on the general structure of government, and as assessment of the way in which responsibilities may best be carried out.

In the United Kingdom, as you are aware, civil defence comes under the home office rather than under the defence department. The reasons for this are perhaps related to the greater burden, or load, or degree of specialization of the minister concerned in the particular country.

In the Department of National Defence there is currently a very large job to be performed, and very heavy responsibilities, both national as well as international, to be carried by the Minister of National Defence. Perhaps it would be wise—and it has been felt for some time to be wise—to have a civil minister engaged in civil activities charged with this responsibility. Now, one of the large elements of the civil defence program is the emergency supplies planning branch which is an element of the Department of Defence Production. The Minister of Defence Production, as a consequence, has direct relationship and a continuing relationship, and an important relationship with civil defence. Perhaps for these reasons he is the appropriate minister.

Mr. MCMILLAN: There has to be close co-operation, then, between your position and the Minister of National Defence in connection with civil defence?

Mr. DRURY: There has to be very close co-operation because of the substantial operations as well as the planning of emergency measures in Canada which is carried out by and through the Department of National Defence. This applies equally to the Department of National Health and Welfare, of course.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: It seems to me as I understand the program, that civil defence, survival, and the Emergency Measures Organization are clearly part of our national defence. Would that be a correct assumption?

Mr. DRURY: They are part of our national security.

Mr. SMITH: I did not mean it in the sense of a department, but rather in the sense of national defence for the defence of our country.

Mr. DRURY: National defence and national survival, or national security, are perhaps the same thing. In the sense in which you mean them, civil defence or emergency measures is a part of the whole, a part of the fabric, I agree.

Mr. SMITH: One part of the British North America Act which one never hears questioned, is the responsibility of the national government for national defence. I have never heard anyone suggest that when we reform or amend the constitution, that this should not be the case. I think that is a reasonable assumption, is it not?

Mr. DRURY: I would go along with you.

Mr. SMITH: I know it was not your responsibility in writing this, nor do you have to accept the responsibility for writing the order in council, and I would think it was not that of the previous minister, either. But I think it is an important matter with legal draftsmen somewhere in the civil service. This brings me to paragraph (*c*) of the order in council.

Mr. DRURY: You mean the 1959 order in council?

Mr. SMITH: Yes. It says to assist the provincial governments in respect of the preparation for civil defence where assistance is not the responsibility of any other department or agency of government. To me that particular paragraph is a real hodgepodge, and it does not explain much. Perhaps you, Mr. Drury, could put me straight on it with regard to what that paragraph does mean.

Mr. DRURY: Well, it is perhaps a bit like the British North America Act in that this is a residual clause. Where there are departments or agencies of the government of Canada which have specific functions in relation to assistance to provincial governments or municipalities covering their particular field, that continues to be a responsibility of that particular federal government department or agency. Where assistance is involved which is not covered specifically, then this covers it, and it is sort of a catchall for the Emergency Measures Organization.

By way of example, we were discussing last week the question of shelters and a shelter program. There is no agency or department of the federal government which has the responsibility for providing assistance to municipalities in this field. This therefore becomes under this

clause the direct responsibility of the Emergency Measures Organization.

Mr. SMITH: Now that you have the responsibility, might I suggest that you and your staff should start working on a new order in council which would be more precisely definitive.

Mr. DRURY: You mean one which would be clearer?

Mr. SMITH: One which would more precisely define responsibilities within the national government. One of the criticisms you hear locally of the Emergency Measures Organization runs something like this: With the way it operates, the local chief of police will immediately report to the man who has been designated as chief of police for the province, or to head of the police in Ontario—it is the head of the provincial police; and the local fire chief will report immediately under a certain set of circumstances to the man who has been designated as the chief of the fire services—I think it is the fire marshal of Ontario. There is a great tendency to centralize.

The particular people involved in municipal affairs think, instead of their reporting to a fire commander, there ought to be some designation within the municipality of one person who would have the responsibility in case of an emergency, and who would have local responsibility, and who would be responsible for complete co-ordination within that area, rather than to have this rather complicated chain of commands that is set up. I may be wrong with this criticism, but I would be happy to be told that I was wrong.

Mr. DRURY: I think that one has to look at this as an endeavour to provide adequate arrangements for as wide a measure of decentralization as possible. In the event that decentralization becomes necessary, or desirable, you must have the machinery and the organization to operate on a decentralized basis. At the present time the government of the provinces operate to a greater or lesser degree on a centralized or a decentralized basis, for some functions, and in some areas municipal organizations, municipal councils, mayors, reeves, or whatever they may be, and their advisers are supreme, although they are not completely autonomous, or completely decentralized.

In respect of other functions, however, particularly technical functions, there is and perhaps there must be a higher degree of centralization, or concentration of authority, because of the greater technical knowledge and skills in the provincial governments. So there are in peace time, or in normal times, some fields in which there is complete decentralized local autonomy, while in others there is a degree of exercise of central authority.

It is the object of the Emergency Measures Organization to carry on in so far as this is possible, a chain of responsibility, and a normal chain of authority, but with provision for complete decentralization to the extent that it may become necessary. And to this end it is our hope that there will be, or there would be in respect to every community or local municipal organizations the ability to function entirely on its own. And if the emergency measures organization in any particular municipality seemed to envisage a greater degree of centralized authority than is now the case, I think there has been perhaps some misunderstanding of the philosophy.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. McNulty.

Mr. MCNULTY: I wonder if the minister could give us some information about the amount of publicity that is put out by the various departments such as the phamphlets that we receive from national health and welfare, from the queen's printer, from various presses under the authority of the queen's printer and from Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as well as from E.M.O. itself. They all put out literature directly concerning things we should do in the event of a disaster, and things like that. How much co-ordination is there between these various departments? Do they sit down with you and agree upon the information that they shall put out?

Mr. DRURY: Yes. All these pamphlets, and publications follow consultation with approval by the Emergency Measures Organization itself. This is done with a view to insuring that there are no duplication of effort or conflict of policy.

Mr. MCNULTY: I was just wondering. You are the minister responsible for this. Do you have meetings with other departments, and are moneys allotted in their budgets with regard to the Emergency Measures Organization? Do you have any co-ordinating meetings to control it?

Mr. DRURY: The co-ordinating body, as Mr. Harkness pointed out, in the final analysis is the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Measures. This committee consists of the ministers who have specific emergency measures functions to perform.

Mr. MCNULTY: So, if a request goes out by this committee to national health and welfare to do certain work, and to the queen's printer to put out certain publications and things like that, it is supervised?

Mr. DRURY: The queen's printer is merely a contractor in this area. He executes the demands made upon him by various government departments. It may be that in respect of a particular instruction or pamphlet, the idea may come from the cabinet committee; or it may come from the E.M.O. itself, or it may be the idea of a particular department concerned. In most cases this would be the inspiration of the particular department concerned with a specific function.

Mr. MCNULTY: Then there is a certain amount of watchfulness or care taken to see that there is no duplication in the publicity put out by the various departments at every level?

Mr. DRURY: That is the purpose of this co-ordination; it is intended to avoid it, and I hope we have been pretty successful to date.

Mr. BREWIN: Are you in a general way familiar with American efforts in this field?

Mr. DRURY: Well, if "general" is not too specific, yes.

Mr. BREWIN: I have an interesting article here entitled "civil defence in a balanced national security". The author is Steuart L. Pittman, assistant secretary of defence for civil defence apparently up to April this year when he resumed his law practice in Washington. He has this to say:

> The civil defence program is geared to a low level of expenditures and makes no pretense of saving large numbers of lives in the impact areas. Although budgetary limitations were an important consideration, the avoidance of difficult and immeasurable problems of a psychological, political and strategic nature also contributed to shaping the moderate characteristics of the program.

I want to ask you if you think our civil defence effort is also geared to a low level of expenditures which, I would suggest, is relatively lower than it is in the United States?

Mr. DRURY: I am not quite sure of all the factors which you feel should be used in equating these things, but I am told that in the United States for their fiscal year 1964-1965 which is the one beginning July 1 next there has been provision made for some $358 million. How much of that will be spent, of course, remains to be seen.

In the United Kingdom for the fiscal year ending April 30 of this year, the expenditure was in the sum of $38½ million. This compares with our current figure of the order of $19 million.

Mr. BREWIN: Would you agree—and I think we should have the facts on this—that our program as well as the American program as described by Mr. Pittman really does not pretend to save large numbers of lives in the impact area?

Mr. DRURY: Neither program pretends to do so. I think that is right. Neither program pretends to save a large number of lives in the impact area. That is quite correct.

Mr. BREWIN: And another article I have, if you wish to refer to it, is to be found in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" of June, 1964, which contains an article by Marvin E. Rozen who is associate professor of economics at the Pennsylvania State University. He has this to say:

> Moreover, any conceivable civil defence program would still mean that millions would die.

That would be in the event of a nuclear attack. That is a fair enough statement, is it not?

Mr. DRURY: Well, this is a bit in the speculative realm I think, when he says that any conceivable defence program would still mean that millions would die. If he is saying any conceivable civil defence against any conceivable attack—given those two absolutes—this statement is probably correct. But it is quite possible to construct caverns at sufficient depth, and to equip them with a decent environment but at staggering cost, which would enable people to survive an attack by known weapons, or existing weapons.

Mr. WINCH: It has been done?

Mr. DRURY: It has been done.

Mr. BREWIN: Are the key words not "staggering costs?" This makes it a little impractical, does it not?

Mr. DRURY: I think it does.

Mr. WINCH: The only reason I bring that up is to suggest that perhaps we should be careful in our statements and not hold out excessive hope as to what can be done with respect to these survival programs. I notice in that connection on page 2 of this statement you have produced here, it says:

Mr. BREWIN: In that connection, on page two of the statement that you have produced here, it is said:

> Because of the short warning time in the missile age and the consequences of a nuclear war, it was thought highly desirable to help ensure, not only the survival of the Canadian people, but also the continuity of government.

The words "ensure not only the survival of the Canadian people" should be taken realistically in relation to any program that is not one of staggering cost with very small results. Some people may survive, but in the main target area very few would survive, no matter what we do about it.

Mr. DRURY: Certainly in the immediate area of impact there would be a high rate of casualties, very little survival, and the cost of ensuring a high rate of survival in the impact area would be so high that I question whether Canadians certainly, and United States citizens probably, would wish to pay for it at present.

Mr. BREWIN: In the allocation of the dollars that we have available for defence purposes, in the broader sense, I take it that the reason for the decision of the government to confine itself to a relatively inexpensive program of civil defence is that the government feels that a concentration on other means of defence which would prevent war is more important than trying to deal with the consequence of a war if it occurs.

Mr. DRURY: That is correct. They necessarily attach a higher priority and are prepared to put more money into preventing a war than in accepting the fact that a war will occur and trying to do more in the sense of ensuring the survival of the population in the impact areas. The amount of money we are now spending on preventing a war would not even begin to ensure the survivability of those in the impact areas in any event.

Mr. BREWIN: Do you not agree that it would be sensible for the Canadian people to realize that even if some civil defence measures are worth while and should be undertaken, that this does not give them any real measure of protection against the devastating effects of a nuclear strike?

Mr. DRURY: It does not give any guarantee of immunity to those in the area of an explosion. There is quite modest expenditure providing a large element of survivability for those who are not in the impact area and who will suffer from the dangers of fall-out and a breakdown of our present system of material supply.

Mr. BREWIN: Even for those in those areas there would therefore be an immense problem of contamination of crops and food and various supplies that are used, no matter what measures we take, which would create dangers of non-survivability, if I may put it that way.

Mr. DRURY: It would certainly create difficulties because most of the materials and supplies in the impact areas would be finished and would be useless. Reliance will then have to be put on organizing the remaining undamaged supplies for distribution.

Mr. TEMPLE: How many municipalities have taken advantage of the 75 per cent contribution from the federal government to build up their own emergency services?

Mr. DRURY: As of last December, some 2,100 municipalities.

Mr. TEMPLE: Out of how many municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: Out of a total of approximately 4,000 municipalities.

Mr. SMITH: Are the 4,000 municipalities urban or rural? Is there any classification of those municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: I have not a breakdown between urban and rural municipalities.

Mr. SMITH: Relating to Mr. Temple's questions, could you supply us with a breakdown because it would make the statistics more meaningful?

Mr. DRURY: Yes. The information is as follows:

	Number of Municipalities[1]	Participating Municipalities[2]	Organizations[3]
B.C.	130	121	98
Alta.	305	179	88
Sask	788	63	34
Man.	188	152	37
Ont.	959	754	49
Que.	1408	674	61
N.B.	43	42	17
N.S.	78	58	23
P.E.I.	28	Covered Provincially	
Nfld.	89		
	4016	2043	407

(1) Information provided by provinces in 1963.
(2) Municipalities include incorporated cities, towns, villages, municipal districts, rural municipalities, counties and townships.
(3) Organizations are comprised of individual incorporated municipalities, or groupings of municipalities, into area, unit, or county organizations.
(4) The municipalities participating in emergency measures represent at least 80 per cent of the population of Canada.

Mr. DRURY: (Continues) Obviously the largest number of municipalities in Canada are rural municipalities. The urban municipalities tend to be big and relatively few in number. The rural municipalities are much smaller and greater in number.

Mr. SMITH: So they would have much less need of this, probably.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Can I put a supplementary question? Can we have a breakdown by provinces?

Mr. DRURY: We can give you the municipalities by provinces.

Mr. LESSARD (*Lac-Saint-Jean*): Could we have those statistics?

The CHAIRMAN: With the agreement of the committee perhaps this information could be put into the record at the appropriate point.

Mr. SMITH: At the point where Mr. Temple asks the question.

The CHAIRMAN: Yes.

Mr. TEMPLE: What is the amount that the federal government contributes? I know they contribute 75 per cent, but is it on the basis of so much per citizen in each municipality?

Mr. DRURY: No. The practice is for the municipalities to cost these plans and to formulate their monetary requirements, which they then send forward to the provincial government. The provincial government examines, scrutinizes, approves these, and sends them on to the federal government, the Emergency Measures Organization in Ottawa. The level of municipality activity varies quite substantially as between municipalities and the various provinces. The level of interest and activity varies. So far we have been able to substantially meet all the expressed needs of the municipalities in this direction. They have to put up 25 per cent themselves, and the necessity of advancing the 25 per cent themselves does condition the size, to some extent at any rate, of their demands on E.M.O.

Mr. TEMPLE: How often are the war books and readiness plans for all departments and agencies revised?

Mr. DRURY: Continuously.

Mr. TEMPLE: I thought that might be the answer. It is a simple answer. It has then been done continuously and an examination of the safeguards has been kept up?

Mr. DRURY: Yes, it has been done in E.M.O. and also in each of the government departments concerned. It is a job of this staff to keep war books up to date. They will obviously tackle one aspect of their war book at a time, and it might be that one element of it might be out of date for a month or so, but generally speaking these are kept pretty well up to date. This kind of operation is necessary because of the changing structure of government departments and because of the changing nature of the jobs that various people do. It is not merely

an overhauling on the basis of new organization or new management techniques being developed.

Mr. TEMPLE: I suppose that as soon as they are prepared or revised they are then sent out to the provinces, or are they sent directly to the municipalities?

Mr. DRURY: No, the war book is a departmental document and it sets forth the procedures to be followed upon the introduction of the Emergency Measures Act. Is that correct?

Mr. PAUL FAGUY (*Director, Emergency Measures Organization*): At the federal level it is an order in council of 1959, and in the provinces they have their own civil defence act.

Mr. TEMPLE: I have one further question. Obviously the government sponsored stockpiles of supplies would include food and clothing. Would they also include any materials or light machinery that would be needed to get the basic parts of the economy going again?

Mr. DRURY: It is quite a difficult task to predict with any kind of accuracy the location of an impact. Consequently, one really has no clear idea of what might be knocked out, and any attempt to stockpile basic or fundamental machinery would lead to a high degree of possibility that what you have stockpiled was precisely what survived the impact and what you had not stockpiled was the same as that which was destroyed. Secondly, there is, in the Canadian economy, a great deal of multi-purpose machinery available—after all this is a sophisticated industrial economy. Rather than try to stockpile machinery, and to do so would be expensive, it seems better to try to get a rough inventory of what our industrial assets are and to try to make contingent plans for mobilizing and using what does survive in the event of an emergency.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): Mr. Chairman, I would like to lead the minister back for a moment to the general concept of the purpose of civil defence. I may be wrong but I have a feeling that the general public have the notion that the whole concept of civil defence is rather a futile exercise in this regard, that it is a rather hopeless attempt to salvage, as a last resort after the catastrophe has occurred, some of the population and some of our resources. In my judgment it is impossible to expect to survive a nuclear war to any worthwhile degree, and therefore it seems to me that the real purpose of civil defence is in part our ability to retaliate and to demonstrate to any would-be aggressor that we have the capability to retaliate at least to a degree that would bring a catastrophe to him as well. It is therefore this ability to retaliate that gives a credible deterrent to any would-be aggressor. The ultimate purpose of civil defence, to my mind, is the deterrent to prevent such a catastrophe ever happening, and in that way we hope that we might be successful in saving the whole population from a nuclear attack. I think that this is a concept of civil defence which is not sufficiently publicized or stated and I would like to have the minister make a statement of his general approach to the whole problem of survival in a nuclear age.

Mr. DRURY: I would agree with you that this is an important facet of civil defence which certainly in this country has not been too well emphasized. The point that you make is that this is evidence of our resolve to mean no when we say no, that the Canadian people are prepared to make sacrifices to accept the consequences of continuing to say no when in fact we do mean no. In the framework perhaps of the western or the northern hemisphere, the Canadian resolve is perhaps not as important as the United States resolve. For this reason I think perhaps more has been made of this in the United States than in Canada. I think it might be a little presumptuous on our part to suggest that a possible aggressor, who might be prepared to launch an all-out nuclear war, would be significantly deterred from doing so by reason of the Canadian determination alone. But certainly the combined determination, of which we form a part, of all the western powers can be significantly measured by their approach to civil defence, and it is our contribution to the total evidence that the western world means no when it says no. In this sense it is a useful and I think significant contribution to the credibility of the deterrent.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): In other words, if a would-be aggressor believed that if he could pull off a successful surprise attack all resistance would immediately collapse, his temptation to do so would be very great. To dispel that notion from the mind of any would-be aggressor civil defence becomes a part of our ability to retaliate. When I say our ability to retaliate I do not refer just to Canada but to the defence of North America as a whole.

Someone else would like to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. BREWIN: I just wondered when you are talking about credibility as an aspect of civil defence, whether the government has given consideration to how much credibility can be purchased with a type of civil defence which, as you have said, still really leaves a great side of the population without protection. If you cannot afford a sufficiently high degree of civil defence to give credibility, you have far more credibility deterrence if you spend money on making your retaliatory weapons immune than if you try the rather impossible task of making the population immune to an attack.

Mr. DRURY: I would perhaps take issue with you in your assertion that our expenditures on civil defence not only are modest but really do not purchase anything. If there were an all out war, the emergency measures that are contemplated and which are being taken now will provide a very substantial degree of protection against the probable threat in Canada.

Now, because there is no provision for immunity of those in what might be the first impact areas, this does not mean that the bulk of the population of Canada has no protection whatsoever. It is likely that the threat

to the bulk of the population of Canada will not be a threat of immediate destruction or incineration. Rather, it would be a threat of the consequences of a breakdown in the distribution of the necessities of life, and a gradual deterioration of the situation rather than a sudden one.

The same thing, to a somewhat similar degree, is true of fall-out. The fall-out is not sudden and instantaneous like a blast; it is something which tends to be a bit more creeping. It is the job of the Emergency Measures Organization to devise means to enable people to meet and survive these threats. With the expenditures currently being made and the plans being drawn up, I think provision is being made for a high degree of survivability against what appears to be a probable attack.

I would agree with you that it would be wrong to convey the notion that civil defence as it now stands is any key to or guarantee of immunity for those who might find themselves in an impact area; it is not. On the other hand, for those who are not, their chances of survival of the consequences of fall-out and disruption of the peacetime or normal means of distribution of the necessities of life, their protection against these threats, I think is quite measurable.

You suggest rather than spending money on civil defence, one should spend money on immunizing the weapons of retaliation. As you know, the means of retaliation rests in hands other than Canada's and consequently expenditures to immunize these are not made or controlled by Canada, but by other countries. There is no means of retaliation in Canada. The weapons we have all are defensive.

Mr. MACLEAN (*Queens*): This question may have been asked at the latter part of the last meeting when I had to leave. I would like to ask the minister when any segment of the Emergency Measures Organization has last been exercised under simulated conditions of nuclear attack.

Mr. DRURY: The last exercise was at the end of 1962. We have not had a large scale one since then.

Mr. MCMILLAN: Four or five years ago a number of shelters were built in the basements of public buildings. I understand they were equipped with equipment to measure the degree of fall-out. I wonder whether that equipment is kept in readiness. Early last year I asked two postmasters who would have access to these particular shelters in time of emergency, and neither one of them seemed to know. Who is responsible for this?

Mr. DRURY: When you say, responsible for maintaining the buildings, it depends a bit on where it is, and whether it is a federal building, a provincial building, or a municipal building.

Mr. MCMILLAN: They were in post office basements.

Mr. DRURY: The responsibility for seeing that these are operational, or the custodianship, rests with the zonal headquarters within the province. Perhaps if you would be more specific than mentioning just a post office, Mr. Faguy might be able to tell you precisely who it is. In general, however, it is the zonal headquarters which is charged with the responsibility for supervising the continued readiness of these shelters.

The CHAIRMAN: Is that all, Mr. McMillan?

Mr. MCMILLAN: Yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Chairman, I have some specific questions which I would like to ask concerning the militia. I think I might address these questions to Mr. Faguy. When the policy for the establishment of the emergency measures organization was drawn up, what specific role was assigned to the militia at that time?

Mr. FAGUY: The responsibility was assigned to the army as such to give the necessary warnings of fall-out to the public, and to assist the municipalities. The army decided the militia would assist it in fufilling their roles.

Mr. DEACHMAN: When the militia was assigned the task of assisting, can you advise what specific tasks were assigned to it by the Army?

Mr. FAGUY: More specifically the re-entry operations, re-entry into the target area, such as a city which might have been hit. They would care for the wounded until the medical people took over, and would provide necessary information for the re-entry forces.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Were these roles pretty well defined, and was the militia actually exercised in these roles?

Mr. FAGUY: The militia was exercised in these roles as part and parcel of their early program. Also, a special exercise was held in 1961-62, and a special militia course at the beginning of 1962.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would this concern the militia in the larger city centres particularly, or in centres everywhere across Canada?

Mr. FAGUY: It is more applicable to the major centres, but this responsibility applied to the militia in general.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If they had a re-entry role to play, and if they were the militia in major city centres, would they not be in the area of attack and not able to play a re-entry role?

Mr. FAGUY: The plan was to have these people located outside the target areas so that they would be able to operate at a headquarters outside a target city, or devastated area.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do I understand the militia was located outside the target area of major cities?

Mr. FAGUY: Not in peacetime, but in time of war. They would be moved to reception areas outside and would be ready to move back in.

Mr. DEACHMAN: If the militia is composed of civilian soldiers, how would you muster them out of their jobs at such times; at a time of early warning, let us say, how would you muster them out of their civilian jobs in the city into an area on the periphery?

Mr. FAGUY: This is a part of the plan where the militia people are told what part they will play at the time of the warning.

Mr. DEACHMAN: You would expect on early warning they would be mobilized and moved to that area?

Mr. FAGUY: Certain people would be called out, yes.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Do you conceive that this is going to be a very useful role for the militia to play?

Mr. FAGUY: Certainly I think this is a useful role.

Mr. DEACHMAN: With the reduction of the militia forces, do you believe this role will suffer?

Mr. FAGUY: I am afraid I could not answer that; it is a matter of government policy what role the militia will play in the future

Mr. DEACHMAN: Up to this point you have considered it to be a useful role?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, certainly.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I notice that the exercises ended in 1962 and that was the last time there was any major exercise. Was the militia involved at the time?

Mr. FAGUY: The army was involved and therefore the militia in the sense we did review our plans at that time.

Mr. SMITH: Just so that an incorrect impression is not left, there have been militia exercises since 1962, and several which have involved re-entry training.

Mr. FAGUY: This is still part of their responsibility.

Mr. SMITH: And these exercises are still going on.

Mr. DEACHMAN: May I direct my final question to the minister. If the militia forces are reduced—and we understand from our studies here that this is to take place—will this role suffer, and if it is going to suffer, what plan is the Emergency Measures Organization making to adopt itself to this?

Mr. DRURY: It is likely there will be fewer militia units available, and we are looking forward to the report of the committee under Brigadier Suttie to make suggestions with reference to how most usefully and most effectively the reorganized militia can fulfil these functions.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Am I fair in saying that the Suttie report and its augmentation are matters of considerable concern to the Emergency Measures Organization?

Mr. DRURY: A matter of great interest.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Deachman, I am not supposed to ask questions, but perhaps you might ask a question for me concerning the practicality of expecting reserve forces in a target area to go out to a headquarters leaving their wives and families in the target area.

Mr. DEACHMAN: I will direct the question to the minister. I think I know what this leads to. If civilian soldiers in a large metropolitan community are to be put on alert, what is going to be their attitude toward leaving their wives and children in the centre of the city while they go out to the mobilization centre outside the city with the prospect of waiting until the bomb drops, and then going in and collecting the ashes of their families. Is there a paragraph anywhere in the book which covers this little item?

Mr. SMITH: What happened to the British soldiers all over England in the last world war? Goodness gracious!

Mr. DRURY: This is obviously one of the dilemmas.

Mr. DEACHMAN: This is a little different.

Mr. DRURY: This is one of the dilemmas that war visits on people. The problem is the same in respect of the civilian members of the population who have designated tasks in wartime, and for whom, because of their important executive function, special provision has been made. There are hosts of those in our civil service who will find themselves in exactly this same position. One would hope that those who have these specific designated functions to perform would be much more knowledgeable than perhaps some other members of the general public, in the action to be taken, and the consequences which might be expected in the event of an attack on Canada. In the pamphlet on instructions for survival, there are instructions in respect of the action to be taken by the families or next of kin of those who have special duties to perform.

Clearly, however, this is one of the problems which we have to face where the man of the family is ordered into relative safety in anticipation of an event, and there is no similar arrangement made for his dependants. For everyone involved in war, this poses a moral dilemma. However, because of the fact that the militia men know what they themselves have to do, and the kind of thing they are going to be up against, they are in a much better position, or should be in a much better position, to make provision for the anticipated removal of their dependants to areas of apparent greater safety.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Would you not agree, Mr. Drury, that the evacuation of the young and healthy men from an area of imminent total destruction and terrible disaster while leaving their families there poses a rather new question in warfare compared to the sending of soldiers to the front to protect an area behind, which has been the case in wars previously.

We are faced here with problems, such as mobilization problems quite beyond anything we have ever anticipated before, and that are really quite to the contrary of Mr. Smith's remarks. This is not related to any problem of mobilization that we have had to face before, where the man was evacuated to safety, while the bomb fell on his family. That has not been our previous experience.

Mr. DRURY: If by "our" you mean Canadian, that is true. However there have been a number of men in the United Kingdom who were sent out to India to be stationed in southern India and they left their families

in London. In terms of physical risk from the effects of war, the man was in comparative safety while his family was left exposed not only at London, but almost anywhere in the United Kingdom. This is not something new except that it is new for Canadians. But certainly in so far as the continent of Europe is concerned, and particularly the United Kingdom in the last war, this dilemma was pretty common.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Had these soldiers left London when it stood a very good chance of being destroyed completely? I do not think so. This was not our experience or belief at that time. We did not believe that our names were on the bomb. I know that was not my feeling, at least when I was in London. I did not believe it and I am sure you did not believe either, or else we would not have stayed there.

Mr. DRURY: There are very few people, no matter where they are, who believe that their names are on the bomb. There are very few people anywhere who believe that. That is one of the useful defensive mechanisms of the normal human being.

Mr. GROOS: I have an important question for Mr. Faguy. Short of an all out nuclear war, I am sure the public thinks that E.M.O. has a role to play. I am thinking for example of the recent Alaska earthquake and the tidal wave which swept down the Pacific coast. I think it increased public confidence very much in E.M.O. with the feeling that they are flexible enough to be able to deal with this sort of emergency. I happened to be out on the west coast at that time, and there was certainly an indication of a liaison between the various United States and Canadian military and civil authorities in this earthquake. It seems to me that the interpretation of the effects of the earthquake and the warning to the public was that they would be evacuated out of the area almost completely. This came about by radio, and by the press over the radio. I wondered if you had carried out any sort of investigation as a result of this incident to find out whether there are some lessons to be learned therein?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we are getting reports now not only from our own people on the west coast, from British Columbia, from the provincial authorities, and we are also obtaining reports from the United States as to what they found out in the greater disaster which occurred in Alaska. Quite evidently this shows the need first of all to have an authority in being to be available to people so that they can ask for help, and so that there will be co-ordination immediately on the spot. That was certainly proved in Alaska where the Alaskan civilian defence co-ordinator was considered by the army and civilian departments to be the co-ordinating authority. At Alberni also, the civil defence people were able to assist in welfare and health and general information. We feel that because of this liaison there should be more or greater emphasis placed on E.M.O. being able to assist local authorities in peace time disaster.

Mr. GROOS: I was thinking more specifically of the events before the tidal wave struck. I think the thing which impressed most people out there was that they just heard it on the radio. They happened to have their radios turned on when it was said that there was going to be a tidal wave striking in the vicinity of that area.

Mr. FAGUY: We discussed this matter with the Department of Transport and they are now studying better means of warning people in the case of a tidal wave. Of course, naturally, when there is an earthquake, you cannot always warn people ahead of time. But in the case of a following tidal wave, they might be able to give a warning. This thing is now under review.

Mr. GROOS: That answers my question.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I go to Mr. Smith, there is another member who wishes to ask a question, Mr. Matheson.

Mr. MATHESON: I think this question has to be directed to Mr. Faguy. From what I can judge, the common denominator in E.M.O. training, and civil service training generally is really the St. John's Ambulance, and that our military and civilian authorities concerned with survival seem to have it as a basis of their training, be it either elementary or senior. They feel there has to be St. John Ambulance training. Is that true?

Mr. FAGUY: The St. John Ambulance type of training naturally is a good type of training.

Mr. MATHESON: In emergency or civil defence work?

Mr. FAGUY: The St. John Ambulance type of training is a good training. But emergency or civil defence work is centered around a core of people who have to deal with many more aspects than simply the St. John Ambulance type of thing.

Mr. MATHESON: I am referring to the common denominator which runs through the training received by the military, be it either full time or militia, or the training received by the E.M.O. people, or even by civil servants in Ottawa.

Mr. FAGUY: Are you talking about first-aid type of training?

Mr. MATHESON: Yes, I am thinking of the answers given by a former government and by the recent government to questions with respect to the number of people who are in active service, or in the militia, and who are E.M.O. trained under the St. John Ambulance.

Mr. FAGUY: Yes sir.

Mr. MATHESON: Does this not tend to be really a common training for all these people? It is true that there are other agencies which operate specialized parts, which go beyond that.

Mr. FAGUY: I would not suggest that it was the only common denominator. For example, there is first aid, which is extremely useful to have at all levels of government, and for defence workers, there are also other aspects of training.

Mr. MATHESON: Is there anything else which is common to all?

Mr. FAGUY: I would suggest anything that had to do with warning, reporting, the continuing of government responsibility, the functioning and availability of reserves —all these aspects are part and parcel of emergency planning. First aid is only one aspect of it.

Mr. MATHESON: Am I right in thinking that it is a major aspect?

Mr. FAGUY: It is a most useful aspect, because we want people to survive.

Mr. MATHESON: That is right. That appears to me to be clear. I am quite interested in our local E.M.O. I have worked with them, and I am also interested in the militia, which is trying to do a survival role very seriously. I am thinking of the Brockville Rifles. It is pretty difficult, however, to persuade the average Canadian specifically, to integrate himself with the E.M.O. program, unless it is under the broader aspect of simple survival under nuclear attack.

Mr. FAGUY: As we have stated in our statement, we feel that the responsibility of E.M.O. is not just for nuclear war, but for conventional war, as well as for peacetime disaster. We think it is quite important, for us to be able to assist in a peacetime disaster.

Mr. MATHESON: Could you give us an idea what departments of the federal government actually make use of the St. John Ambulance in one way or another?

Mr. FAGUY: E.M.O. recommends first a training for all civil defence workers, and we also pay an amount of roughly $4 per head to those people who have successfully completed the course. This is done through the financial assistance program to the provinces and municipalities. This is done generally right across Canada.

Mr. MATHESON: You could not go beyond the Department of National Defence?

Mr. FAGUY: The department of defence has a similar type of training, and our department is part and parcel of their training program. I do not have the figures to suggest how many in each department have been part and parcel of the training program.

Mr. MATHESON: The arrangements between the departments are generally comparable, one to the other, in that respect.

Mr. FAGUY: That is right; and we have an emergency service co-ordinating this type of training. It is directed by a medical doctor.

Mr. MATHESON: I have been interested in E.M.O. for some years, and I have the feeling that the St. John Ambulance Association, which is made up essentially of a great corps of retired service personnel, and those who have governmental responsibility in different areas, is a pretty useful corps for E.M.O. to rely upon from time to time, even for advice and guidance. It would be a very valuable group to work with. Does E.M.O. work with these people?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we do. For instance, when there is an annual conference for the emergency health service, the St. John Ambulance people are always available and take part at the various discussions which take place from time to time.

Mr. MATHESON: Do you happen to know Brigadier Johnson?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we know Brigadier Johnson very well.

Mr. GRANGER: I gather that survival depends roughly upon two things: one is to assure peace as much as possible. The other would be to live underground. I take it that the latter is unrealistic for a number of reasons. Therefore, every possible attention is being given to maintaining peace in order that people may live normal lives as much as possible. But in the event that an emergency did arise, are there in existence plans for the orderly removal of people from a threatened area? For example, would the population of a city be distributed around where there would be less danger?

Mr. DRURY: Reception areas have been organized largely through the militia for a fairly large scale movement of people. There are not, however, completed plans or completed arrangements for the removal of an entire population, let us say, such as from the city of Toronto. This does not exist. Manifestly one would virtually have to build an alternate urban complex.

Mr. GRANGER: I was thinking, perhaps, not of the removal of all parts of the population who were necessary to carry on the business of the people, but rather to cover them over in as wide an area as possible.

Mr. DRURY: What at the moment is contemplated is a voluntary individual decision in relation to evacuation without any specific indication where people might or should go. What we are doing is to make provision to notify people of the areas into which they should not go because of the dangers of fall-out. This would depend on a whole reporting scheme, the location of the detonation, and the direction in which the fall-out would be most intense. These would be danger areas. There are under the aegis of the military, a limited number of reception areas contemplated to which emergency welfare services could be supplied, and to which people could repair if they had no other place to go.

Mr. GRANGER: I could take it then that this is a matter which is under constant consideration?

Mr. DRURY: It is, and I do not think that with the changing nature of the threat it is possible to say today that we have a final and immutable plan. It keeps getting revised and changed all the time.

Mr. GRANGER: But the problem is continually before you in your mind?

Mr. DRURY: Yes, it is.

The CHAIRMAN: Now, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH: The moral implication of Mr. Deachman's question, if carried to its logical conclusion, would make one wonder if any attempt at survival in civilization as we know it is worth while anyway. I have a couple of questions for Mr. Faguy concerning the role of the militia in survival.

Is it not a fact that the way, for instance, that armories are being relocated on the edge of a city is purely to make them more useful? I am thinking of the new armories at Toronto which are up north on highway No. 401.

Mr. FAGUY: I could not state for certain what facts are involved in relocating the armories, to be honest with you.

Mr. SMITH: For instance, with the militia units on the fringe of the large cities—would they not have a large and important role in re-entry and recovery?

Mr. FAGUY: Certainly in the case of the militia, that is so. That is part of their responsibility.

Mr. SMITH: And the militia units located around or near large centres of population are quite important in that respect?

Mr. FAGUY: They are very important at the present time, yes.

Mr. SMITH: I have two simple questions to ask the minister. We are talking about exercises. The Lanark Scots were having an exercise last Sunday. Mr. Brewin in his earlier question emphasized the futility and the hopelessness of the unrealistic matter—perhaps that is not the correct word—in trying to defend a target area, where there could be a direct hit or a blast. Is there any danger in overemphasizing the difficulty of defending a target area? Does that not really tend to discourage people who live in areas which are almost certain to be fringe areas from taking means to protect themselves against fall-out?

Mr. DRURY: There is that danger. It is one I tried to qualify for Mr. Brewin.

Mr. SMITH: Your answer to a supplementary question did emphasize it, but I think it is a point which needs to be emphasized all the time and continually, that we are dealing with two problems; and that the second problem is that it would be possible for survival for western civilization, and that is the one which relates to fall-out; and in that field I think it should always be emphasized that something can be done.

Mr. DRURY: You are right.

Mr. MCNULTY: I am not sure whether the minister or Mr. Faguy should answer this question. But Mr. Temple asked the same question about a number of municipalities participating in E.M.O. I notice that you may possibly have a village or township participating on its own, and I think you have maybe two or three counties joined together in one large complex. Do you recommend any basic unit in geography, or population, as being the most economic for E.M.O.?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, we have naturally to fit our plan into what the actual situation is in each province. As you know, some call them townships, counties, boroughs, or what have you. We try to use the existing units as they now exist. But where we have a number of small villages or smaller towns, we prefer to see these units grouped together to make one civil defence unit with one co-ordinator. This is more economical and we think more effective.

Mr. MCNULTY: Where you group those units together, those of the various municipal bodies would participate on a per capita basis, and they would have their director setting up a budget. He would set up this budget. Now, how much would the municipal unit have to pay towards the cost, the over-all cost? What percentage of the budget?

Mr. FAGUY: This is by agreement with the provinces. Each province decides how much the municipalities should reimburse them. The federal government pays 75 per cent and generally the province is responsible for 25 per cent. They in turn can share this with the municipalities, which comes to approximately 10 per cent.

Mr. MCNULTY: This can vary from province to province?

Mr. FAGUY: The municipalities do not have to pay anything because of the province agreeing to pay up to 25 per cent of the cost.

Mr. MCNULTY: Would there be a possibility of getting the figures on what the provinces charge back?

Mr. FAGUY: We could do this. The answer is as follows:

The sharing arrangements on municipal financial projects under the Federal Financial Assistance Programme, by provinces, is as follows:

	Federal	Provincial	Municipal
	%	%	%
Newfoundland	75	25	—
Prince Edward Island	75	25	—
Nova Scotia	75	15	10
New Brunswick	75	12½	12½
Quebec	75	15	10
Ontario	75	15	10
Manitoba	75	15	10
Saskatchewan	75	—	25
Alberta	75	12½	12½
British Columbia	75	15	10

Mr. MCNULTY: This would be the same if the municipalities wanted to set up E.M.O. themselves. Would this have to go into the budget and they would then only contribute 10 per cent of the cost of the building?

Mr. FAGUY: That is right.

Mr. MCNULTY: Would this building be the property of the municipality?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, whoever is the lowest in the government echelon becomes the actual owner of the property. In this case it would be the municipality.

Mr. McNULTY: Suppose they pulled out of E.M.O.; what would happen to the property?

Mr. FAGUY: Before disposing of the property they have to come back to E.M.O., because we did share the cost, and arrive at some agreement on what the situation would be.

Mr. McNULTY: This is the same as in the case of buying major equipment?

Mr. FAGUY: Yes, the same.

Mr. McNULTY: I wonder if it would be possible to find out how many municipalities have taken on emergency measures organization units and then for some reason or other pulled out of the organization, and the reasons why they pulled out?

Mr. FAGUY: Perhaps we could give you an approximate number. I am not sure we could be accurate on this one. It would be especially difficult for us to be accurate on the reasons for pulling out because they vary so much.

Mr. McNULTY: Economical reasons might have a lot to do with it.

Mr. FAGUY: Generally the cost to the municipalities is not too great and therefore this has not been the reason for it in most cases.

Mr. BREWIN: My question is directed to the minister. In the light of what Mr. Smith has said about my previous questions I would like to say that even if I am sceptical it is because I want to get the facts on these matters.

The questions I have to ask relate to two matters. I think the same questions are relevant to both. One is on the feasibility or practicability of the re-entry role, and the other is on the feasibility of the dispersion of people in the so-called target areas. Both seem to me must be considered according to the amount of warning time that is available.

At this stage I will preface my question by referring to a document that has been provided for us, entitled "the survivability in likely target areas— Blueprint for survival, No. 5". At page nine it says that a deliberate nuclear attack in North America will probably be prepared with elaborate secrecy to be delivered with maximum surprise and therefore it is unlikely the government will be able to give the public any long range warning of an attack. Defence preparations of a dramatic nature such as the ordering of evacuation of the target areas during a period of strain in national relations, could increase the danger of war starting. Later on it refers to something we are familiar with, namely that with the I.C.B.M. the warning time will be from 15 to 30 minutes. I thought the lower figure was the more accepted figure.

If a surprise nuclear attack is made with a warning period of 15 minutes, how does that make the idea possible of people engaged in business and industry having to go out into some area outside the city, collecting there and being ready and available for the re-entry operations at a later date? How does it make it possible? It seems to me completely illusory to imagine that the 15 minutes would be enough.

Mr. DRURY: Certainly not very much can be accomplished in 15 minutes. I agree with this. The 15 minutes, however, applies to the first weapon arriving on the continent, and it applies in respect of the impact area. For someone who is in this situation, 15 minutes is not going to be much help. However, it may be that in respect of subsequent weapons there may be a longer period, and more particularly the consequences may not be immediate just outside of the impact area but in an area of prospective heavy contamination. People who are organized and prepared know precisely where they have to go and what they have to do, and have thought about this in advance. There is some possibility of them being able to do a useful job. Now, the problem that you have enunciated is recognized, and this business of meeting the re-entry task is currently being re-studied and under review by the Department of National Defence.

Mr. BREWIN: This of course applies a fortiori in voluntary dispersion. You spoke of the other civilian population, and I suggest it might rather complicate the factor. Perhaps one thinks of one's constituency most often, I am thinking of mine in Toronto. A fairly large scale voluntary effort to disperse might make it harder, with the roads being blocked, for people in the militia to reach the area of collection.

Mr. DRURY: This is quite true.

Mr. BREWIN: On the other side of the picture, an early dispersal taking people out of their jobs because of threatened international tensions would, as is suggested in this pamphlet, be provocative and certainly a very dubious thing. It would be very hard on the population and on the militia to start sending them out because things were getting pretty tense.

Mr. DRURY: That is recognized in the pamphlet quite specifically.

Mr. BREWIN: Does it not suggest then—I am putting it to you very strongly—that the proposed role of re-entry by people who start from the target areas in their jobs, and the proposed dispersion, have become a little obsolete in the light of the short period which we would get in an attack from an I.C.B.M.? I understand that with a bomber attack the warning would be two or three hours, but I suggest that the thinking has become a little obsolete in this case.

Mr. DRURY: Clearly a plan which is dependent on the relatively long notice one would get from a bomber attack would not be appropriate for an all-out missile attack. It is recognized, and it is one of the principal reasons for the review currently being made. But one must bear in mind that perhaps one should not be too absolute merely because there will be some people involved in the re-entry function who may only get 15 minutes' notice. There will be others, further away from what turns out to be the impact area, and one cannot

predict who will have more than 15 minutes' notice. One has to try to utilize the resources which do survive as well as make plan for those that may survive in the most effective way. I think that if a scheme can be evolved to provide for re-entry assistance, it is better to try to make use of such a plan than merely to abandon the whole thing because of the difficulties involved.

Mr. BREWIN: Would it not suggest that regular troops stationed further outside the target area would really be in a better position to do something about this than the militia units?

Mr. DRURY: Of course most of the regular troops are in fact outside of the likely target areas, or possible target areas. The militia will add to or supplement these regular forces. It is also a fact that at the present moment a large proportion—something in excess of 50 per cent—of the militia units are stationed outside of the probable target areas or impact areas.

Mr. DEACHMAN: Mr. Drury, does it not seem wrong that we are attempting to organize emergency measures from the centres of the cities in which the very people who are expected to carry out emergency measures are the ones who are first going to be wiped out by the bomb? This is exactly where the bomb is going to fall; it is going to fall on the centres of the major cities. The E.M.O. seems to be centred among the militia units at the centres of these cities, so that those who carry out the emergency measures, and the organization for emergency itself, will be one of the first things to be wiped out in an attack.

Should we not be reversing the whole procedure of our emergency measures and saying that this is an organization which ought to be organized out in the country, all around the periphery of those cities which are likely to be wiped out? Should we not organize the people now living there, the people whose beds can be converted to hospital beds, and setting up our stores out there? We will not prevent the bomb from falling. If the war comes it will be here in 30 seconds. What we should do is to organize those people who will unalterably survive in such a way that they can do something for the people from the cities who would be coming out to them. Instead of that we have the whole thing reversed. I believe we are spending an awful lot of money and directing an awful lot of attention to doing things which in the first crack will be wiped off the face of the earth, when in reality we should be saving God knows how many people who are on the fringe or who are in panic when this happens. If we organized in the country instead of organizing in the city, the whole thing would be approached in a more realistic way.

The CHAIRMAN: That is a long supplementary, Mr. Deachman.

Mr. SMITH: And the facts are largely wrong also.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Chairman, I have a supplementary question.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us keep some order. Mr. Deachman has asked a supposedly supplementary question. We will clear that one up first, if we may.

Mr. DRURY: I think perhaps your assumption that E.M.O. is designed, based on, and operates from the centre of the target area, is incorrect—this is not so. Indeed, the regional headquarters, which will be the core of the continuing operations, and the zonal headquarters, are specifically located outside of these probable impact areas. Further, the reception areas, which will be the nerve centres for the survival operation, are likewise outside. They will be manned to the extent possible by people originating from outside of the impact areas. But it is an unfortunate fact of life that the government of this country is conducted by people who normally live and operate in possible target areas. Now, you can endeavour to organize a system of government —and that is basically what we are thinking of—made up of people entirely different in character, quality, and everything else, than the people who are now governing the country.

Mr. DEACHMAN: That is all that will be left after the bomb.

Mr. DRURY: You are contemplating almost the worst possible circumstances. This may be true.

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Matheson would like to ask a supplementary question.

Mr. MATHESON: Mr. Drury, although defence is not your department, no one knows more about it than you do in the cabinet.

Mr. SMITH: Flattery will get you nowhere!

Mr. DRURY: I deplore this accolade.

Mr. MATHESON: Traditionally in the United Kingdom the militia, the old territorials, were largely composed of country yeomen soldiers. They were not metropolitan soldiers. You had your large recruiting facilities in the large centres such as Liverpool, London, and so on, and obviously this was necessary. However, if our attitude towards our militia is to veer off from the idea that the militia now be a recruiting centre for a quick mobilization of world war I or world war II type—and we are thinking rather of something which partly provides security for Canada—then serious consideration should be given to the merit, which I think is inherent in Mr. Deachman's question, that in recruiting the militia emphasis should be put on the unpopulated areas of Canada outside the target areas. In other words, we should not be recruiting our militia from Toronto or Ottawa, but we should do so from areas extending all around those areas.

Mr. DRURY: Probably before expressing views of this character I would prefer to wait for the rather more considered opinion that Brigadier Suttie will produce in this committee.

Mr. MATHESON: I was thinking of the E.M.O. point of view. You are our witness.

Mr. DRURY: Obviously the emergency measures is one of the important aspects of the whole militia problem, and I am satisfied that the committee had this fully in mind.

Mr. MCNULTY: When disaster strikes in an area and you have a specific unit there, does the army, or the militia or the director of E.M.O. have charge of the survival operations?

Mr. FAGUY: Charge of the survival operations is always given, in normal peacetime, to the local authorities. Co-ordination of all the efforts is the responsibility of the co-ordinator. He is asked for assistance and he co-ordinates all the efforts.

Mr. MCNULTY: Suppose you have all three in the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The civil authority would act as required. If he wants the army to come and assist, there must be an official request to the army to come and provide assistance.

Mr. MCNULTY: They are not responsible to the permanent army unit or the permanent officer in the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The army comes in and provides assistance when requested by the provincial authorities as foreseen in the National Defence Act.

Mr. MCNULTY: Who is responsible for getting the people out of the area?

Mr. FAGUY: The local authorities, the mayor and the council. They may use the civil defence co-ordinator or some other person whom they would designate to take charge of the operations.

Mr. MCNULTY: I thought the army had authority over everyone when disaster strikes and war is declared. I was under the impression that if war is declared the army is in supreme command.

Mr. FAGUY: There are two different situations. When disaster strikes in peacetime the local authorities can request the army to come and help. In wartime, if a city becomes a target, the army has authority to come in and start re-entry operations, and give all the assistance they may be able to give.

Mr. MCNULTY: So the militia comes under the control of the permanent army?

Mr. FAGUY: And the local commander.

The CHAIRMAN: That completes the list of questioners. Are there any further questions? The committee stands adjourned until Thursday at 11 o'clock. The witness will be Commodore Groos and the topic will be the *Defence Colleges and allied training plans.*

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
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